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For nearly a decade, Eritreans have been fleeing their oppressive government and the human 
rights violations that occur within Eritrea‘s borders. This flight usually takes them across the 
nearest border, but there appear to be choices that refugees make along the way that lead to 
patterning of flight, selection of certain countries of safe haven and emerging hierarchies of third 
countries of resettlement. For geopolitical reasons, Eritrean refugees are both safe and at risk in 
Ethiopia. However, it is in Ethiopia that a highly trafficked refugee camp, Shimelba, was created 
in 2004.  Beginning in 2009, the US has been accepting Eritrean refugees from this camp as a 
group resettlement. As the world economy continues to deteriorate, however, life in the US may 
be more difficult for refugees than ever before.  
This thesis will focus on the expectations of refugees before and during the process of 
group resettlement, and the complicating factors involved in resettlement, including US policies 
on terrorism, political interference in resettlement cases by Eritrean political groups, and the 
pressures to ―thematize‖ personal narratives for the purposes of resettlement success. Interviews 
were conducted with refugees expecting to be resettled to the US on the front end of the group 
resettlement, as were employees at international organizations who work in the protection and 
resettlement sector.  To gain an understanding of the effects of group resettlement on the 
diasporic community, I contextualized refugees‘ experience with respect to the transnational ties 
that bind those in exile to those still inside Eritrea. These ties can be seen as transnational 
networks that permeate boundaries between citizen and refugee, home and abroad, political and 
social, and link refugees to the broader Eritrean diaspora in unexpected ways.   
Through this analysis, I have concluded that because Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia are 
accepted prima facie, they do not have a firm understanding of human rights concepts, and have 
undergone a change in subjectivity only concerning the experiences of awaiting resettlement as 







Thanks for Country for Asylum 
For Sheltering my Life 
But I am not living enough 
Still thinking to resettle my life 
Forget suffering, the future will be fine 
Please UNHCR save my golden time,  
To solve my tangled problem 
To jerk in artistic frame 
So I am begging again and again, 
To those capable to fulfill my vision. 
 
Poem  2 
 
I strived for years to switch on the light 
And I finally got that switch with the wrong circuit 
This is a betrayal of the blood of brave I left. 
Red, represent the blood shade I saw in the past 
Finally, I shift myself to another coordinate 
It‘s shell-shocked and differs from my expectations. 
Still living in gagged and bounded situations 
Unfit with human habitation 
Deterioration of profession 
Hope diluted by desperation and frustration 
Represented by deep dark green 
Since I am optimistic,  
I want to stay out of vengeance, politics and revenge 
Please try to be the bridge of my dream 
I need good pictures of me, at the end of my album 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Policies Acted: The Effect of Pluralism and Policies on Eritrean Refugees 
Eritrean refugees have been migrating to Ethiopia for decades and as a result of many 
different political and environmental factors (Connell 1997; Hepner 2008, 2009a, b; Iyob 1995; 
Kibreab 1985).  However, there has been a drastic increase in Eritrean migration to Ethiopia over 
the past seven years. By registering with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Eritreans hope to have the opportunity for resettlement in a Western country.  The 
process of time-case resettlement
1
 has been slow, leaving many Eritreans stranded in Ethiopia for 
up to six years. UNHCR policies are further confounded by US polices on terrorism and 
immigration quotas; however, UNHCR and the US government have just announced that a group 
resettlement to the US has been approved for the majority of residents of Shimelba refugee camp 
in the desert of Northern Ethiopia.  In presenting a case study of the experiences and attitudes of 
encamped and urban Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, this thesis illustrates the ―front-end‖ of 
refugee resettlement and forced migration, or how refugees experience and navigate the initial 
challenges of flight into exile.  The intersection of US policies on immigration, international 
institutions that monitor these processes, local Eritrean political opposition groups that insert 
themselves into the resettlement process, and the experiences of individuals seeking resettlement 
to a third country must be explored to understand the effects these processes have on the overall 
Eritrean diaspora community, and on Eritrean identity and consciousness.  By analyzing how 
refugees in Ethiopia do or do not articulate an emergent human rights consciousness, we see 
where UNHCR humanitarian policy fails by defining ―protection‖ narrowly, even while 
                                                        
1 Time-case resettlement is the process of resettling refugees in the order they arrived in Shimelba.  During this 
fieldwork, UNHCR was processing refugees who were registered in August 2002.  See Chapter III for a discussion 
of durable solutions and resettlement procedures. 
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engendering refugees' awareness that international policies and laws based on human rights 
norms exist to protect and assist them. I further contextualize this analysis of refugee 
consciousness and action in terms of US policies that leave some refugees stranded, and 
Ethiopian government policies that can short-circuit the human rights regime for refugees. 
Refugees in a Global World 
 Are refugees lost within the system that is meant to protect them?  Does the political field 
that dictates international policies for the management of refugee populations protect or endanger 
communities of displaced people?  How do refugees themselves understand their tumultuous 
movement through this system?  Does prior knowledge of the system make the path to 
resettlement smoother or less painful?  How would a refugee describe the changes to his life, 
identity and place within a social fabric resulting from this experience? 
 Africa is currently undergoing a refugee crisis.  With conflicts raging in various countries, 
and issues of poverty, structural violence, and power disparities, there have been vast migrations 
of people from country to country, region to region, and out of the continent. Recent reports by 
the UNHCR, for example, indicate that among the 16 million refugees worldwide, 2,271,200 are 
in Africa, with 815,200 in East Africa and the Horn of Africa alone (UNHCR 2007b).
2
  The 
―refugee regime‖ as Malkki (1995) termed it has developed over several decades to manage 
these migratory patterns and to arrive at a ―durable solution‖ for these forced migrants.  Indeed, 
in 1951, Hannah Arendt noted that refugees were the human rights case, par excellence, ―the 
most symptomatic group in contemporary politics‖ (1986: 277).  ―In spite of the lofty rhetoric of 
human rights (of rights accruing to human beings as human beings), the implications of a lack of 
                                                        




citizenship in a world carved up amongst sovereign nation-states were, as Arendt realized, 
absolutely devastating‖ (Gibney 2004: 2), and it is for these people that the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were developed.  Through an exploration of the refugee 
regime in the Horn of Africa, and a discussion of the historical and political events that have lead 
to mass exodus from Eritrea, I am able to understand some of the experiential effects of forced 
migration on Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia.   
Anthropologists in the field have found that in the shadows of war, people across cultures 
develop similar survival mechanisms and engage in collective healing in parallel ways (see 
Nordstrom 1997 and 2004; Farmer 2004; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004; Fithen and 
Richards 2005); these patterns of life can be observed as the capabilities to survive and readjust 
to the legacies of warfare.  For Eritreans, these coping mechanisms are often entangled with the 
transnational nature of the Eritrean diaspora, spanning Africa, America and Europe.  
Anthropologists studying Eritrea have found that many of the phenomena of Eritrean 
transnationalism are both repressive and limiting (Hepner 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009a; Hepner and 
Conrad 2005; al-Ali, Koser and Black 2001; Woldemikael 2005). In this thesis, I expand this 
analysis of transnationalism to include the policies and practices of the refugee regime as it acts 
upon the newest refugees to leave Eritrea. The reality of transnationalism for the Eritrean 
community is twofold: in one sense, Eritreans in diaspora must navigate a pluralistic legal 
system incorporating international, national and local laws in order to find refuge and 
resettlement.  Secondly, transnationalism is germane in the case of the Eritrean refugees because 
of the development of transnational political governance and activism in the Eritrean diaspora 
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(Hepner 2008, 2009a and b), manifested as political organizations that cross international 
borders, as human rights campaigns originating in South Africa, Europe, and the US, and in the 
way that the Eritrean state administers and polices its citizens living in other countries. 
Navigating Policies and Information Networks 
The research for this thesis was conducted with refugees in urban and encamped 
situations in Ethiopia, in Addis Ababa and Shimelba Refugee Camp, respectively.  These 
refugees are dependent upon UNHCR and the Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs 
(ARRA), and to some extent, NGOs like the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the 
World Food Programme (WFP), for security and well-being.  However, they have created and 
maintained extensive local and transnational support networks that transfer information and 
financial/material goods so that the refugees are increasingly able to make informed decisions 
regarding their future.  This developing agency is crucial to the sense of well being in the refugee 
camp, in that it enables individuals to make choices regarding the manner in which they 
approach UNHCR and ARRA for protection, and further, to make decisions about whether they 
will remain in the camp or flee again, to Sudan, from where they can try to make their way 
through Libya to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe. 
Refugees in Ethiopia, and Eritreans in diaspora, pass information in the form of whispers, 
emails, and phone calls (to name only a few of the methods they use); these knowledge 
exchanges can be envisioned as broad information networks that cross borders and penetrate 
boundaries created by the Eritrean government to curtail the flow of information.  Because the 
participants in these networks feel that they must keep their involvement secret, the networks 
have been thrust into the shadows, and as such, participants have developed methods of secrecy 
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in their information exchange.  The clandestine information networks that I observed, indeed, 
participated in, convey information concerning current events and methods of escape, and pass 
along news of individual situations.  They can therefore be shown to subvert the hegemony of 
the Eritrean regime and that of the refugee regime, and to permeate the boundaries of 
transnational communications.  They operate in the shadows, are enacted with codewords, and 
cross many languages (Nordstrom 2004).  Actors use cell phones, the internet, and word of 
mouth to pass information that can be dangerous to possess, yet that is seen to be advantageous 
for obtaining recognition by the refugee regime.  The transnational communities of Eritreans that 
have emerged around the world engage in information sharing that blurs the boundaries of 
political conflict (Bernal 2005).  Yet, at times, the stresses of being a part of a community of 
political refugees forces one to step into the shadows, for this political sphere is rife with 
competition and betrayal.  It is one in which opposition parties harass people, and pressure them 
for involvement, and in which it is rumored that deals can be made to ensure or prevent 
resettlement based on cooperation with opposition parties and Ethiopian government agents. 
This conflict is further exacerbated by the tactics used by the plethora of opposition 
parties to the Eritrean government.  Since independence, there have been political organizations 
forming which challenge the legitimacy of the government as democratic.  These parties, 
forming, splitting and reforming, color the experience of being a refugee.  Involvement is 
inherently political in a world where politics are illegal: Ethiopian law prevents refugees from 
engaging in political affairs.  It is a world in which everyone is an enemy, for the opposition 
groups compete with each other for power, membership and support, much like the revolutionary 
fighters in Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 
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did during the war for independence from Ethiopia. The actions of the current opposition parties 
operating from their bases in Addis Ababa are crucial to an understanding of the risks refugees 
take every day.  By outlining how the opposition groups insert themselves into the resettlement 
process, even of those not involved in the opposition, I will show how the clandestine and overt 
networks interact, and that the fate and future of individual refugees are shaped by these 
intersections.  Indeed, it is on the constant battlefield that has become the refugees‘ lives that we 
see how taxing it can be to be living in what Green terms a ―state of fear‖ (2004). 
I further explore how the policies implemented by institutions and organizations, 
including but not limited to the US and Ethiopian governments, UNHCR, ARRA and various 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have a direct effect on the day-to-day lives of 
individual refugees.  This effect is sometimes in contrast with the humanitarian and aid goals of 
the organizations (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005), but the organizations (and individuals 
within them) must also navigate the transnational refugee regime to determine how to enact the 
policies that dictate assistance to refugees (Loescher 2001).  Thus, I address the ways that this 
form of transnationalism – that of the refugee regime – interfaces with Eritrean political 
transnationalism, including the activities of opposition groups as described above.  
Two Transnationalisms 
Here, it is important to draw attention to the intersection of everyday refugee life and 
regional and international politics, and back to the two iterations of transnationalism.  The 
refugee regime, including Ethiopian, UNHCR and US policies, governs Eritrean refugees but 
does not necessarily keep them safe from the pitfalls of their own transnationalism.  Especially 
for Eritreans, life in diaspora is lived in a ―transnational social field‖ (Glick Schiller and Fouron 
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2001).  This is not the same transnationalism in which international refugee policies are created.  
The refugee regime is transnational in that it straddles national and international policies, and 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions (Malkki 1995; Fullerton 2006; Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005).   
Eritrean transnationalism is similar, for it also crosses the government-population 
boundaries and permeates individual lives as well as state operations.  Since before Eritrean 
independence, the diasporic community has engaged in political involvement from outside 
Eritrea, and has had a considerabe impact on Eritrea‘s history.  In the years since independence, 
the Eritrean national community has participated in a unique transnational governance system 
(Hepner 2008, 2009a).  In recent years though, political opposition groups have begun emerging 
across Eritrean diaspora, and especially seated in Ethiopia.  These competing networks – pro-
state nationalist and political opposition – merge in the Eritrean transnational sphere (Hepner 
2009a).  
Eritrean transnationalism overlaps with the transnationalism of the refugee regime, 
especially in the environments that refugees navigate on the path to resettlement.  As stated 
above, the refugee regime is transnational in the sense that it encompasses the international 
policies and practices which define and manage refugees, as well as the national policies of the 
governments which provide refugees with safe haven. One illustration of this intersection of the 
―two transnationalisms‖ is the Ethiopian government‘s involvement in the opposition.  As I 
learned while conducting field research, Ethiopia (legitimately or not) financially and 
ideologically supports some but not all of the Eritrean opposition groups.  The government  also 
prevents the achievement of the full spectrum of human rights for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia 
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by restricting their freedom of movement and freedom of work, to name two (see also Jacobsen 
2002).  The US government has recently agreed to accept Eritrean refugees as a group (Priority 
2) resettlement.
3
 However, US policies including immigration quotas and restrictions of 
―terrorist‖ actors prevent some refugees from Eritrea being resettled due to their past 
involvement in a non-state military group (Frelick 2005; Gibney 2004).  Indeed, UNCHR is 
predicting that there will be Eritreans stranded in Ethiopian camps due to US and other 
countries‘ policies (Interview with UNHCR official, May 24, 2009).  Similarly, UNHCR and 
ARRA have many intersecting policies that maintain the camps in an orderly fashion, but that 
undermine the human rights of refugees. Some of these policies include restricting the freedom 
of movement of refugees and preventing them from accessing paid employment (both human 
rights guaranteed by international law) and indirectly, by not strictly enforcing women‘s rights 
within the camp. By outlining these and other policy practices and their effects, I will show how 
multiple political paradigms and policy agendas intersect and have an impact on refugees‘ lives.  
Human Rights Consciousness?  
At the start of this fieldwork, I had hypothesized that refugees‘ battles within the system 
would lead them to envision themselves as right-bearing citizens; that is, that the process of 
becoming a refugee, and navigating the ―two transnationalisms‖ described above, would trigger a 
shift in consciousness, and that refugees would begin understanding their experiences in terms of 
human rights. After all, the definition of a ―refugee‖ that is crucial to be recognized by UNHCR, 
                                                        
3 Priority 2 group resettlement is assigned to ―groups of special concern to the U.S. It includes specific groups (that 
could be defined by their particular nationalities, clans, ethnicities, religions, location, or combination of such 
characteristics) identified by the Department of State in consultation with [US Citizenship and Immigration 
Services] USCIS, non-governmental organization (NGOs), UNHCR, and other experts‖ (Refugee Council USA 
website: http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page=eligibility-for-u-s-resettlement, accessed March 31, 2008). 
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ARRA, and other governments, is based on human rights law. Moreover, in Tricia Redeker 
Hepner‘s larger research project on Eritreans seeking political asylum in the West, in which I 
have been participating as a graduate research assistant, we have detected an emerging pattern 
that suggests that the process of seeking asylum in the West does in fact encourage people to 
develop a consciousness of individual civil and political rights.  Certainly, with the gathering of 
over 10,000 refugees in Shimelba, and the experience of waiting for years to be resettled, we 
expected there might be a change in subjectivity for Eritreans during the long, arduous process.  
One of the key objectives of this research was to analyze if there is an emerging human 
rights consciousness among individual refugees. To that end, I interviewed twenty five Eritrean 
refugees in Ethiopia to understand their changing expectations of the institutions that control 
their lives.  I was also interested in discovering in which situations they are able to exercise 
choice and agency, and in which situations they are divested of these (Thieman-Dino and 
Schechter 2004).  Using excerpts from interviews to illustrate how their individual experiences 
get lost within the bureaucratic definitions of the refugee regime, I conclude that a change in 
subjectivity does take place. These changing subjectivities are more closely related to feelings of 
powerlessness and an emerging awareness of self that can be visualized as lines of interesting 
identities that permeate the boundaries between refugee and citizen, Eritrea and diaspora, warfare 
and peace, past and present, warzone and home, and friend and enemy. 
 However, the change in consciousness I observed among Eritrean refugees does not 
support the hypothesis that Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia undergo a shift in subjectivity towards 
that of rights bearing citizenship or human rights more generally. Instead, I argue that as a result 
of being de-individualized by the refugee regime in Ethiopia, Eritrean refugees have not had to 
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make explicit use of any human rights concepts per se and therefore do not talk about their 
experiences in these terms.  They do, however, demonstrate an experiential awareness: they 
discuss their suffering, the effects of encampment, the complications from living under the radar 
in urban situations, and the eternal waiting game of the resettlement process.  The depersonalized 
nature of this muddled process in Ethiopia does not necessitate the use of human rights concepts 
in the same way that the more individualized asylum process in the West does, and for this 
reason, we see among Eritrean refugees a consciousness focused much more on raw experience, 
rather than the human rights arena which nonetheless structures their lives and their futures as 
refugees.   
Analysis of my field data will enable me to illustrate this emerging consciousness, the 
confounding factors of political opposition involvement in the process, and the manners in which 
US, UN, and Ethiopian policies have an impact upon refugees.  Through this examination of 
individual subjectivities (e.g. consciousness and agency) and how they interface with 
transnational and legally pluralistic models and human rights norms, I hope to approach the 
―refugee regime‖ in a new light. By illuminating the intersections of the refugee regime (and the 
legally pluralistic policies enacted within that regime), and the transnational character of Eritrean 
life, we will see how individuals steer themselves through the system, and the transformations 
they undergo during the process.  
Based on these patterns, I posit that refugees‘ experiences are flavored by their ideas of 
the international human rights arena, and specifically how they have learned, or not learned, to 
articulate their claims in the language of human rights. Their ability to use human rights 
concepts, or not, likewise has an impact on their subjectivities and consciousness about the 
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circumstances in which their lives have necessarily been transformed (see Harmon – Gross 2008 
for previous formulations of the changing subjectivity of Eritrean asylum seekers).  
Doing Fieldwork in Ethiopia: Research Design, Methods, and Challenges 
There are currently between 10,000 and 20,000 Eritreans living in Ethiopia who have 
registred with UNHCR and ARRA as refugees from the Eritrean state (Interview with UNHCR 
staffer, May 16, 2008).  Though there are likely tens of thousands of Eritreans in Ethiopia who 
are not registered as refugees and have migration histories spanning generations, I focused only 
on refugees who have entered Ethiopia since 2000.  These Eritreans are accepted prima facie as 
refugees, meaning that simply by being Eritreans outside their country of origin, UNHCR 
assumes that they fit the definition of a refugee outlined in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol on the Status of Refugees.  This is because the crisis in Eritrea and widespread 
violations are so well known to the international community.  These individuals are living both 
legally and illegally in Ethiopia according to that country‘s policies: if they have registered with 
UNHCR and the Ethiopian government agency, ARRA, they are legal; if they have entered the 
country and simply tried to fly below the government and institutional radar, they are considered 
illegal.  Further, the individuals I worked with live in primarily two situations: the Shimelba 
refugee camp, and in the capital city of Addis Ababa.  There are Eritreans in other camps in 
Ethiopia, particularly the Afar Refugee Camp, but I did not interact with any Eritreans who had 
passed through there.  Encamped refugees are nearly all legal, for without registering, they will 
not receive food rations or other services.  Some of the camp residents who were formally 
registered, and therefore considered legal, are also living illegally though, having left the camp 
for the urban setting.  The urban and encamped communities are constantly changing, with much 
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flow between the two and a great exchange of resources and ideas feeding into both from the 
larger Eritrean diaspora.  Though all types of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia are concerned about 
risk, many of them were familiar with anthropological inquiry, and were as such willing to 
participate in this research project.   
This thesis is based on fieldwork I completed in Ethiopia, both in Shimelba refugee camp 
and in Addis Ababa, the capital city, during the summer of 2008, followed by an analysis of the 
patterns and interactions I observed.  Over nearly two months in Ethiopia, I performed 
qualitative ethnographic research concerning the refugee regime and Eritrean refugees in 
particular, based largely on a ―snowball sample‖ of accumulated contacts in Ethiopia.  I 
conducted participant observation in community events, informal discussions, twenty five 
informal interviews and sixteen formal interviews concerning refugees‘ experiences that 
precipitated their flight from Eritrea to Ethiopia, how they have (intentionally or unintentionally) 
navigated the transnational political arena, and what their expectations of the ―refugee regime‖ 
(Malkki 1995) have become as a result of being part of an ever-fluid community of people who 
are profoundly affected by the enactment of policies and processes. 
I also investigated how officials in certain governmental and humanitarian organizations 
viewed their roles and responsibilities.  These methods consisted of interviews, meetings, 
discussions and observations between organizational staff and refugees, at the UNHCR and at 
the ARRA compounds in Addis Ababa and Shimelba.  I met with the senior protection officers 
in both organizations, and was allowed to observe ―protection hours‖ between protection officers 
and individual refugees.  Protection hours are weekly drop-in visits that refugees can make to the 
officers if they believe that they have security issues within the larger community.  Both 
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UNHCR and ARRA offer this time for refugees to discuss their cases if they feel that their safety 
among the general population of refugees is in question.  I also observed International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) staff members implementing social work, education and community wellness 
programs in Shimelba, but did not interview these employees formally.   
This study is part of a larger project that I have been working on as a graduate student at 
the University of Tennessee, with Dr. Tricia Redeker Hepner, comparing the experiences of 
Eritrean asylum seekers in the US, Germany, and South Africa . Her work to date has examined 
how the thirty-year nationalist war of independence from Ethiopia resulted in patterns of 
transnational governance and civil society in independent Eritrea and its global diaspora (Hepner 
2003, 2005, 2008, 2009a). In recent years, however, the Eritrean government has become 
increasingly authoritarian and militaristic, leading many younger, educated people to flee the 
country by any means necessary (O‘Kane and Hepner 2009; Hepner 2009b). Our current 
research continues this investigation of the relationship between forced migration and political 
consciousness and action in Eritrea and in exile. In particular, we are examining how the process 
of seeking asylum in relatively more coherent legal environments leads many young asylees, and 
other Eritreans, to reconceptualize themselves as rights-bearing individuals and citizens.  
Through this previous fieldwork in the US with Tricia Hepner, I had met Eritreans who 
have achieved immigration status through immigration, refugee resettlement, or asylum 
channels.  Working with these individuals in the role of researcher and advocate, I gained 
familiarity with the transnational social field in which they participate.  As I was preparing for 
departure to Ethiopia, many of these Eritreans provided me with the contact information of 
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friends in Ethiopia, both in Addis Ababa and in Shimelba refugee camp.  It was through these 
contacts that I began my interactions with the Eritrean refugee community in Ethiopia.  
Once in Ethiopia, I made use of multiple gatekeepers to the displaced Eritrean population 
in Ethiopia.  It was through these men, all refugees themselves, that I made contact with 
everyone in my research sample, was given advice about how to navigate the political climate for 
refugees in Ethiopia, and was prepared to see what I found in Shimelba.  Further, I allowed 
people to approach me as they heard about my work in the community, thereby becoming 
participants.  This phenomenon increased as time progressed.  Many of the participants with 
whom I became familiar recommended friends who they believed would add dimension to my 
work.  Very frequently, I was told that I should conduct interviews with people from various age 
groups, ethnic groups, of both genders and from different parts of the diaspora community.  
Many of the young men I met were college educated and had a great respect for the scientific 
method.  The care that these participants had for representativeness in my research sample was 
striking, and I was guided into interviews with individuals from many segments of the displaced 
population in both urban and encamped settings.   
Before entering the field, I designed research instruments that would allow me to make 
structured investigations into the phenomena of transnationalism (both that of the refugee regime 
and the Eritrean diaspora), human rights consciousness, and changes in subjectivity that were of 
interest. Using these interview protocols, demographic and survey-like questions, in addition to 
broader participant observation, I was able to collect information from a variety of sources, yet in 
a consistent, replicable manner.  Interviews with refugees consisted of both direct and open-
ended questions about demographics, political involvement, experiential description and human 
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rights awareness (see Appendix 1 for the full interview protocol).  Interviews with governmental 
and nongovernmental staff included questions concerning policy changes and implementation, 
migration trends, and bureaucratic hurdles facing refugees. 
Due to the secrecy that Eritreans employ when discussing their migration journeys, and 
the fact that the government of Eritrea is known to hold accountable the family members of 
Eritreans who have fled (as well as the inherently political nature of refugeehood) there was a 
very political nature to my work.  It was clear from the actions and reactions of participants to 
some of my questions that there was an inherent risk involved in discussing some of these issues 
with me.  Over only a short span of time, I became aware of the weight that each refugee 
believed was inherent in each telling of his narrative, that there was a certain gravity to the 
experience of being a refugee that rendered things too personal to be openly discussed, and 
wielded as overt fact.  It was my responsibility to inform people of the potential risks, as I 
understood them, in participating in my research, to protect the identities of those who chose to 
speak with me, and especially to guard all material and information that I received from them.  
The ensuing awareness on my part, and cautiousness on the part of many of the Eritreans I met, 
flavored the methods that I employed in the field.   
Building trust was an issue however, because I had contacts from the US, and trust was 
relayed from them to their social networks in Ethiopia, I was able to use clandestine networks of 
trust and communication to my advantage.  Thus, it was not a difficult thing to begin 
conversations with many Eritreans in Addis.  Often, knowing my research aims, and the potential 
use of the resultant work as a part of human rights reports or in future policy directives for 
managing the Eritrean refugee crisis, individuals brought friends or acquaintances, who, for the 
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most part, were willing to talk with me.  Many days or weeks passed with only informal 
discussion, during which I proved my knowledge of and compassion for their circumstances and 
created a framework of trust and understanding with these individuals before I requested the 
opportunity to do formal interviews.  The discrepancy between the number of individuals I met 
and conversed with informally and the number of people who agreed to participate in a formal 
interview on the record belies the feelings of vulnerability and the concern for safety that 
allowing one‘s voice and ideas to be recorded entails.  The sixteen interviews I conducted on the 
record followed a set of questions I had determined ahead of time, of both closed and open-
ended nature, and covering topics from demographics to life stories and human rights 
consciousness, which I tested through a respondent‘s ability to speak coherently on human rights 
and relate these abstract concepts to their own lived experiences.  Naturally, I allowed people to 
choose the locations and times that we were to meet, and if an interpreter was needed, I was sure 
to let individuals choose a person they were comfortable telling their story through.  In the rare 
event that they did not already know who they wanted to interpret for them, I was willing to use 
an interpreter whose ability, neutrality and confidentiality I trusted.   
The first pattern I noticed was that many people told me they would allow me to 
interview them, but significantly fewer actually availed themselves for that interview.  Many 
people were willing to discuss political issues, reveal their sentiments about opposition parties 
and the resettlement process, but they were concerned about what it meant to be interviewed, 
with a tape recorder or not.  This cautiousness extended into the interview planning process and 
affected location and time of day that we were able to conduct meetings.  This may have been 
due to wariness on the part of refugees towards further becoming further bureaucratized as a 
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research object.  Further, members of opposition parties and other organizations were ambiguous 
during their interviews about participation in these groups, despite my direct knowledge of such 
status.   
In contrast, government officials and NGO workers seemed to be unconcerned about 
secrecy and safety when meeting with me.  Interviews, meetings and discussions with them 
proved much easier to secure than with refugees, though refugees far outnumbered these 
institutional actors.  For these interviews, I had also prepared interview protocols prior to arrival 
in Ethiopia.  Access to organizations such as the UNHCR was not difficult, for Dr. Hepner and I 
had contacted Mme. Louise Aubin, a Senior Protection Officer in the Ethiopian office, prior to 
my departure.  She put me in contact with other officials and allowed me to observe protection 
and resettlement appointments between protection officers and Eritrean refugees who were 
willing.  In Ethiopia, I also contacted the government agency, Agency for Refugee and Returnee 
Affairs, ARRA, which was unresponsive until I was present in the capital city.  Upon accessing 
their compound, the protection officers there were very cooperative, and ultimately granted me 
access to Shimelba refugee camp, as well as engaged in discussions and provided information 
sessions for me, both in Addis and Shimelba.  They also offered to arrange interviews with 
refugees.  I did not accept this offer though, for fear of being linked to ARRA and for want of a 
less biased sample.  
During my two months in Ethiopia, I attended many public events of concern to Eritrean 
refugees, ranging from Eritrean Independence Day celebrations, to a concert for World Refugee 
Day, a non-formal education graduation ceremony of adult students in Shimelba, and musical 
trainings for International Day of the African Child.  I also met with many groups and 
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committees, especially during my stay in Shimelba.  These groups ranged from the Central 
Committee (a self-governance organization of people elected to represent the refugee community 
living in the camp), women‘s organizations, political groups who oppose the Eritrean 
government, art organizations, and schools.  Further, I was invited into people‘s homes for 
meals, for birthday parties, and for coffee ceremonies.  It was through these types of participant 
observation and interactions that I learned that the experience of being a refugee permeates all 
aspects of life; that from the moment one wakes up, until the moment he goes to sleep, all of his 
interactions will be flavored by the fact that he is a refugee.  It also became clear how 
dramatically the effects of policies and interactions with governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations are perceived by refugees, who analyze every encounter with representatives from 
ARRA and UNHCR, looking for signs that their case is moving along.  
Through this work, it should be clear that I consider myself to be a critically engaged 
activist researcher (Speed 2006; see also Scheper-Hughes 1995).  Speed pairs ―critical cultural 
analysis‖ with ―the overt commitment to an engagement with our research subjects that is 
directed toward a shared political goal‖ to ―create productive tensions that we might strive to 
benefit from analytically, rather than seeking to avoid‖ (2006: 71).  Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois ―recogniz[e] the weakness and limitations of ethnography but [suggest] a more human 
role of engaged witness over that of scientific spectator.  This requires a certain wariness of the 
ways that naïve fieldworkers can fall prey to delusions of political activist grandeur‖ (2004: 26).  
By allowing myself to become enraged by the political events I observe (Scheper-Hughes 1995) 
and looking critically at the situation facing refugees, including those humanitarian organizations 
that are presupposed to be human rights protectors (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005), I have 
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employed my power as an anthropologist to accomplish goals in a reflexive manner with the 
population I was studying (Speed 2006).   
All of my work is informed by the fact that I oppose human rights violations by any 
government, and that I recognize the Eritrean government to be a gross violator of human rights 
of its citizens.  Therefore, I presupposed that refugees were leaving Eritrea following genuine 
abuses of their human rights, and a well-founded fear of persecution, as the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees indicates.  Indeed, the Ethiopian government and 
UNHCR itself register refugees from Eritrea prima facie, accepting all Eritreans who have fled, 
without forcing them to prove they had been persecuted in Eritrea. This is because the patterns of 
abuses are so well documented in Eritrea, but also because it is politically expedient for the 
Ethiopian government, which is bitterly opposed to the Eritrean government, to recognize all 
Eritrean refugees.  It is the experience of being subjugated to lifelong military service, religious 
persecution and inhumane treatment that is causing the hemorrhage of Eritreans, mostly youth, 
from the country (O‘Kane and Hepner 2009).  Further, I feel that refugee protection is the global 
community‘s responsibility and that this responsibility extends to accepting refugees for 
resettlement.  Increasing numbers and ease of resettlement is then a priority for applied 
anthropology, as is understanding the effects of the process itself on the individual and 
community levels (Thieman-Dino and Schechter 2004).   
Another aspect of my research design was intended to facilitate my understanding of how 
the transnational organizations work among Eritreans in diaspora, and more specifically, 
Eritreans who have recently fled into Ethiopia as refugees.  The organizations I was interested in 
are political groups that stand in opposition to the Eritrean government.  Like many 
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organizations that were created during the thirty-year war for independence, these groups have 
members outside of Eritrea and receive funding and other support from these members in 
diaspora.  The groups I was able to study are all based in Ethiopia, formed of members that are 
Eritrean refugees there, and are receiving remittances from Eritreans in the US and Europe. In 
the course of my fieldwork I met with and interviewed people who identified with these groups, 
and I also observed how members of these groups behaved vis-à-vis other refugees in Addis 
Ababa and Shimelba camp.  By analyzing the manner in which these opposition groups related to 
each other and to refugees, as well as defined their goals, I could assess the effect these 
transnational organizations are having on the lives of Eritrean refugees, and the manners in 
which political involvement intersects with the resettlement process. This is the interface 
between the ―two transnationalisms‖ I discussed earlier.   
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters and will address the following issues: the 
process of becoming a refugee, the structure of the refugee regime in Ethiopia, the experiential 
effects of refugeehood, the politics of the refugee world, and issues of human rights 
consciousness.   Chapter I has been an introduction to the anthropological concepts, theories, and 
methods that I have employed to analyze the data I collected in the field over the summer of 
2008.  Chapter II, ―Becoming Refugees: Flight into Ethiopia,‖ gives a brief background of the 
Eritrean nation-state, its thirty-year war for independence and the 1998-2000 border war that 
have all triggered exclusivist nationalism and precipitated repression that now amounts to some 
of the worst human rights abuses on the planet.  By situating the precursors to refugees‘ flight in 
an historical timeline, it becomes clear why the past seven years have lead to increased migration 
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out of Eritrea.  In Chapter III, I describe the refugee regime in Ethiopia, and outline the roles of 
ARRA and UNHCR in working with refugees to attain a durable solution.  Chapter IV concerns 
the experience of being an Eritrean refugee in Ethiopia.  I give brief descriptions of urban and 
encamped situations and discuss the hardships faced in each.  Chapter V, ―The Politics of 
Refugeehood‖ covers the second transnational sphere through which Eritrean refugees navigate: 
that of the political groups that stand in opposition to the Eritrean government.  These groups 
coerce refugees to join, and are rumored to be ―inserting‖ themselves into resettlement 
interviews to the detriment of individual refugees.  In the discussion, Chapter VI, I begin 
drawing conclusions about whether or not Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia are actually undergoing a 
shift in consciousness towards human rights and rights-bearing citizenship.  I have determined 
that they are not able to use human rights tools to augment their experiential understanding of 
persecution, refugeehood and the resettlement process, and attribute this lack of consciousness to 
the fact that they are accepted prima facie by UNHCR.  In the concluding chapter, Chapter VII, I 
ask further questions and draw attention to lacunae that can be filled with further research on the 
transnational nature of the refugee regime and to what we can learn about changing subjectivities 




Chapter II: Becoming Refugees: Historical Precursors to Flight into 
Ethiopia 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as  
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case 
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last 
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. [UNHCR 
2007c: 16] 
 
The nature of refugeehood is inherently political, for, as Malkki quotes Loescher (1992: 
4-5), ―too often refugees are perceived as a matter for international charity organizations, and not 
as a political and security problem.  Yet refugee problems are in fact intensely political: mass 
migrations create domestic instability, generate interstate tension and threaten international 
security‖  (in Malkki 1995: 504).  Much as Malkki outlines the development of the refugee 
regime, and the anthropological involvement in its study (1995), Fullerton discusses the 
development of refugee protection and its relation to international human rights law (2006).  In 
Eritrea, the events that precipitate flight are a crucial part of understanding the choices that 
individuals make when leaving Eritrea, and the experiences they have within the refugee regime 
thereafter.  In this chapter, I will discuss the events that have caused the recent mass exodus out 
of Eritrea to Ethiopia.   
Many authors have examined the political history of Eritrea and the formation of Eritrean 
nationalism; for this information, the reader will be better served by referring to the main works 
in the field (e.g. Connell 1997; Hepner 2009a; Iyob 1995; Killion 1998; Markakis 1987; Negash 
1997; Pool 2001; Tronvoll 1998).  A brief history will suffice here. 
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Eritrea was given its name, meaning Red Sea, by the Italians, who colonized the region in 
the late nineteenth century, and governed the small nation until after World War II, when the 
land was reunited with Ethiopia in 1952.  Under Italian colonial rule, Asmara underwent great 
expansion, and the region became the industrial center of East Africa (Wrong 2005).  Great 
advancements in architecture during that period still create a European feel in the capital city, 
which is rumored to be one of the safest cities in Africa.  Italian influence can be seen in much of 
Eritrean culture, from the influence of Catholicism, to popular cuisine and language to the 
educational system. 
Following the Italian period, Eritrea was ruled by the British Military Administration 
until 1952, at which time it then was ceded back to Ethiopia. Internal resistance to Ethiopian rule 
did exist within Eritrea throughout the post-war period, and in 1958 with the founding of the 
Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), and followed by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF, 
founded in 1960) and the Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF, founded in 1970).   
In 1974, Ethiopia underwent a revolution, in which rebel groups ousted Emperor Haile 
Selassie, and instituted a communist regime called the Derg.  Under the oppression of the Derg, 
opposition movements developed in Ethiopia, but were easily destroyed because of great 
amounts of Soviet support (Donham 1999).  It was not until the late 1980s, and finally 1991, that 
the USSR did not renew its support for the Derg regime. At that time, both Ethiopian and 
Eritrean opposition groups were able to defeat the Derg and secure Eritrea‘s independence.   
The strategies that the nationalist rebel movements utilized during Eritrea‘s thirty-year 
war for independence still characterize much of the political life in Eritrea nearly 50 years after 
they formed.  A brief history of the most significant opposition groups during the struggle for 
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independence sheds light not only on the current government, but also on the tactics of political 
opposition groups to the current Eritrean regime, and how life in diaspora is permeated by 
transnational political ties.  
The first such organization, ELM, was defeated by Haile Selassie‘s regime by the early 
1960s.  In its place developed the Eritrean Liberation Front, a militarized group formed by 
Muslims from the lowlands in the East, together with students living in Cairo while studying at 
Al-Azhar University.  The transnational nature of this group was evident from the beginning, 
pulling support from US cities, where immigrants worked more than one job to send remittances 
back to the guerilla soldiers waging war for independence.  The ELF was further assisted by 
Islamic countries in the region that were sympathetic to the desire of Eritrean Muslims to gain 
independence from the harsh, oppressive Ethiopian regime (Hepner 2009a). 
As internal conflicts arose within the ELF, the group fragmented, and the Eritrean 
People‘s Liberation Front (EPLF) formed.  Following an intermittent civil war between ELF and 
EPLF, the EPLF gained the upper hand, and by the early 1980s had either exiled the ELF from 
the country or co-opted its fighters and civilians (Hepner 2005, 2008; Pool 2001; Woldemikael 
1993). As the thirty years of guerrilla struggle came to fruition, the political ideology of the 
EPLF became incorporated into the institutional structure of the ruling party of independent 
Eritrea.  The government is still comprised of a single party, the People‘s Front for Democracy 
and Justice, or the PFDJ.   This political party, lead by Isayas Afwerki, has never held elections 
and has not implemented the Eritrean constitution, which was drafted by the Constitutional 
Commission and ratified in 1997 (Hepner 2009a).  As such, they are a ―transitional‖ government, 
though they have been in power since the war for independence ended in 1991 and Eritrea was 
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recognized as a nation in 1993 following an international referendum, which included the 
Eritrean diaspora in Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Ethiopia.   
As Hepner details (2008, 2009a) the PFDJ also operates transnationally, with members of 
the party living in diaspora, and reporting back to the centralized government.  Some of these 
members are paid government officials who pressure Eritreans living in diaspora to exact 
support, both ideological and financial. For example, if individuals living abroad refuse to pay 
the 2% diaspora tax, they may not be permitted to receive a visa for trips back to Eritrea or renew 
Eritrean passports (Hepner 2008).  In some cases, the families still living in Eritrea are 
threatened if people in the diaspora become politically noncompliant (Hepner 2008).  Beyond 
official government employees, there are also unofficial informants working in diaspora to 
achieve PFDJ‘s ends.  As the PFDJ becomes more repressive in Eritrea, more and more political 
opposition groups form in diaspora, and more people begin reporting on each other‘s 
involvement in the opposition.  Occasionally this is done in a tit-for-tat manner, with people 
reporting their neighbor‘s affiliations in order to deflect the gaze from themselves (Interview 
with successful asylum seeker in the US, January 17, 2008). 
Transnationalism has played a role in Eritrean politics and life since before 
independence; indeed, a large part of the successful struggle came from diaspora, both from 
refugees and migrants living in the US (Hepner 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009a; Hepner and Conrad 
2005; Woldemikael 2005).  These urbanized Eritreans, a product of the Italian colonization, had 
moved to urban centers in the US, where the EPLF created linkages between home and abroad.  
The ELF also forged transnational linkages based on opposition to the EPLF‘s control of the 
nationalist movement. It was in the 1960s that the first webs of entanglement with diasporic 
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networks appeared.  ―The transnational origins of the Eritrean nationalist movement are thus 
historically significant, as is the role of the ELF and its civic predecessors in forging the kinds of 
organizational and institutional practices that have been central to Eritrean political life ever 
since‖ (Hepner 2009a: 20-21). 
However, with the fracturing of the ELF, the strengthening of the transnational 
movement became a goal of the EPLF, which created organizations in cities across the US in 
order to garner further support from members living abroad.  Later, PFDJ would utilize these 
same channels to continue the militarization of the population both at home and in diaspora; 
these tactics have flavored both nationalist ideology in the 16 years since independence and the 
networks of opposition and resistance that have developed and strengthened since the 1998-2000 
border war with Ethiopia. 
This ―transnational social field‖ (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001) is the arena in which 
much of Eritrean life is lived, with exile communities continuing to grow and change in cities 
throughout the US and Europe.  It has become inevitable that every Eritrean living in Eritrea or 
in refugee camps in the Horn of Africa is in contact with some of these individuals, thus making 
new refugees also a part of the transnational community.  In fact, I further suggest that the 
transnational social field is characterized by clandestine networks of communication that mirror 
the tactics the ELF and EPLF used during the war for independence (Harmon-Gross 2008).  
These often cross borders and permeate boundaries between peace and war, free and oppressed, 
political and social, private and public. 
The demarcation of the Eritrean border after independence has remained contested, with 
both Eritrea and Ethiopia claiming land on the others‘ side.  War broke out again in 1998, and 
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Ethiopia immediately deported more than 70,000 Eritreans living within their borders.  National 
military service in Eritrea is compulsory for both men and women, with required service for all 
people ages 18 to 40, although often prolonged further.  During the border war, the government 
created many military training camps and outposts along the border with Ethiopia.  These 
training camps have since served as outposts for large groups of detainees in the time since.  The 
border war resulted in thousands of casualties on either side and has contributed greatly to 
mistrust and ―othering‖ in both nations.  Ultimately, a negotiation was reached, and the Algiers 
Agreement was signed in December 2000, but Eritrea‘s natural resources and socio-economic 
environment had been severely debilitated during the extended years of fighting (Negash and 
Tronvoll 2000).   
Though there was a demarcated border presented during the conference in Algiers, 
Ethiopia rejected the demarcation, and a stalemate has ensued.  As a result, the UN created a 
peace-keeping mission to the region, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(UNMEE), which had also been working on defusing the many thousands of landmines 
throughout the region.  However, in April 2008, Eritrea cut off fuel supplies to the UN mission, 
thereby making it impossible for them to remain in the border region, and precipitating 
withdrawal of UN resources (Deen 2008). 
The border war and the post-war years have resulted in increased migration of people out 
of Eritrea, creating overflow in refugee camps across both the Sudanese and Ethiopian borders.  
The post-war condition is such that for many educated urban youth, it is difficult to find 
employment outside of the military and government, marriages and birthrates have dropped, and 
freedoms have been curtailed severely (O‘Kane and Hepner 2009).  ―All Eritrean citizens above 
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the age of 18 have a duty to serve in the national service and forced recruitment of adults and 
minors is so widespread that the country has been decried as ‗completely militarized‘‖ (Bailliet 
2007: 11).   
The final year of high school for all Eritrean students is conducted in Sawa, deep in the 
Eritrean desert, near Ethiopia.  No Eritrean can graduate high school without completing military 
training.  Some students are ―permitted‖ to remain on as teachers at Sawa in following years, and 
some are simply assigned to the Sawa camp (Riggan 2009).  Sawa has become a much higher 
trafficked area since Asmara University was closed in 2006 (Muller 2009).  Even prior to this, 
the government had begun repressing students; in 2001, thousands of university students were 
detained for protesting government policies. Many of these students describe torture at the hands 
of authorities and harsh living conditions during this illegal detention (Amnesty International 
2005).   
In addition to arresting the students, in September of 2001, the government also 
undertook a widespread movement against all journalists, arresting many, killing and 
disappearing the rest, and completely eliminating non-state press in Eritrea.  Further, they 
captured fifteen former members of the PFDJ, now known as the G15.  These fifteen dissidents 
passed an open letter, in which they accused President Isayas Afwerki of ruling illegally.  This 
was preceded by an earlier letter composed by prominent Eritrean leaders in the diaspora, called 
the Berlin Manifesto, the first document criticizing the government so thoroughly.  Of the 
members of the G-15, eleven remain in jail, one has been coerced into rejoining the PFDJ and 
three have migrated to the US.  At least three of those detained are thought to have died due to 
torture and/or medical neglect. The jailed officials have not been charged, although they have 
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been informally accused of treason (Amnesty International 2007).  The Central Office of the 
government claims they share ―...a common guilt: at the minimum, abdication of responsibility 
during Eritrea's difficult hours, at the maximum, grave conspiracy" (Cobb 2001).   
Arbitrary arrests, long-term detentions, torture and disappearances have become a way of 
life in Eritrea, as can be noted by numerous human rights reports issued by Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, Reports without Borders, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, Freedom House, and even the US State Department.  Further, religious institutions 
are restricted and in some cases banned, and no freedom of the press exists. Most NGOs have 
been closed and most foreign aid is rejected, though the country is not able to feed its citizens.  
According to Human Rights Watch (2008), Eritrea is one of the worst human rights violators in 
the world. President Isayas Afwerki recently ranked number eight on Parade Magazine‘s list of 
the ten worst dictators in the world (Wallechinsky 2009). 
In Eritrea, the state, which is normally charged with the protection of human rights, is the 
greatest violator. This is not unusual, as scholars of human rights have long pointed out forced 
migration is often the result of sweeping human rights violations by state authorities (Afflitto 
2000; Mahmood 2000; Nagengast 1994; Sluka 2000), and these levels of abuse and 
dehumanization are the basis of asylum claims and refugee status determination (Malkki 1995; 
Thieman-Dino and Schechter 2004).  Over the past seven to ten years, there has been an 
increasing exodus out of Eritrea.  When it was founded, Eritrea was said to have between three 
and four million citizens; with the current emigration levels nearing almost 1000 each month, 
Eritrea is becoming depopulated, a social upheaval precipitated by ―the government‘s strategies 
of development through militarization.  In pursuing its agenda largely through coercion, and 
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disproportionately targeting the most skilled and educated sectors of society for ideological and 
physical discipline, the government has precipitated nothing short of a hemorrhage of human 
capital in recent years‖ (Hepner 2009b: 115-116).  Most of those emigrating though asylum or 
refugee resettlement seem to be ―yearning to join the diaspora‖ (Kibreab 2005).  Those who 
remain have been forced to live a life veiled in secrecy, much like Linda Green describes in 
Guatemala, where she witnessed socialization to state terror: ―one cannot live in a constant state 
of alertness, and so the chaos one feels becomes diffused throughout the body, [military] training 
is designed to break down [the] sense of personal dignity and respect for other human beings…. 
Fear has been the motor of oppression‖ (Green 2004: 186-189).  These same phenomena have 
forced much of Eritrean life into the shadows, where people operate within and exchange 
information through clandestine networks.  
 Despite the fact that a developing Eritrean ―ethnicity‖ (Hepner 2000) glosses over the 
fact that many ethnic populations live within Eritrea‘s borders, a brief definition of the main 
ethnic groups is necessary for discussion of issues in the population that has been displaced to 
Shimelba camp in Ethiopia.  The majority of people in Eritrea are of the Tigrinya ethnic group, 
and speak the Tigrinya language.  Most of Eritrea‘s educated and urban population are of 
Tigrinya background. Another ethnic group, the Kunama, is nomadic pastoralist, and embodies 
more stereotypically ―traditional‖ African values, such as matrilineality, animist religious beliefs, 
female genital cutting, kinship rights and communal building, to name only a few such 
characteristics (UNHCR 2009).  Kunamas, historically resistant to the EPLF, were the first 
internationally displaced peoples from Eritrea, and were the founding population of Shimelba 
refugee camp. A still smaller ethnic group, the Saho, rounds out the ethnic representation in the 
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camp.  Most of the people involved in this study were Tigrinya, simply because I was 
investigating complex phenomena in an educated, urban youth sub-population. These people also 
tended to have a better grasp of English than members of other ethnic groups.  
It is specifically the result of the border war, in which nearly 100,000 people died, and 
the events of September 2001 and beyond that have caused the current hemorrhage from Eritrea.  
Since the border war with Ethiopia, Isayas Afwerki‘s government is becoming more repressive 
and Eritrea is becoming more militarized.  More and more youth are leaving by any possible 
route as exclusive nationalistic polices have increased, and human rights abuses have become 
commonplace in Eritrea.  The mass exodus of youth from Eritrea to its neighboring countries and 
onward to Europe, the US, Canada and Australia is broadening the transnational quality of the 
Eritrean diaspora.  However, unlike some asylum seekers who have undertaken this migration on 
their own (Harmon-Gross 2008), and legal migrants, refugees do not seem to undergo a clear 
shift in consciousness towards that of rights bearing citizens, who are able to use human rights 
laws for self protection.  The following chapters will be an analysis of the pervasive effects of 
living as a refugee in Ethiopia and the prolonged period of liminality (Turner 1969) while the 
gears of the refugee regime crank towards a group resettlement for Eritreans.   
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Chapter III: Two Transnationalisms: The Refugee Regime in 
Ethiopia 
Simply because of the definition of a refugee – a person who has crossed international 
borders – and the nature of the refugee regime itself, the refugee experience is lived in a 
transnational social field, crossing borders and permeating nation-state boundaries.  The 
international refugee regime operates across the developing and developed world, with 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and multiple governments contributing 
policies, funding and employees to management of the refugee ―problem.‖  The actors and 
institutions involved in the refugee regime create what I call one of the two transnationalisms, 
the oft-studied organizational body that offers protection and finds durable solutions for the 
millions of displaced people globally (Black 2001; Crisp 2008; Fullerton 2006; Gallagher 1989; 
Inhetveen 2006; Jacobsen 2002; Jacobsen and Landau 2003; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005).  
Gallagher describes the evolution of the refugee regime after the Cold War as 
a large and complex system of international, regional and national responsibilities 
and relationships…In addition to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and 
some 30 other international agreements on refugees, approximately 20 regional 
instruments had been introduced to deal with the issue…refugees were present on 
every continent.  International governmental and nongovernmental organizations 
had emerged to work on these problems.  Formal and informal agreements had 
been reached as to how these organizations would work together…The 
dimensions of the problem encompassed legal protection rights, emergency 
responses, continuing care and maintenance and the promotion and 
implementation of durable solutions. [1989: 584] 
 
Malkki describes the ―different discursive and institutional domains within which ‗the refugee‘ 
and/or ‗being in exile‘ have been constituted.  These domains include international law, 
international studies, documentary production by the [UN] and other international refugee 
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agencies, development studies, and literary studies,‖ and she terms this realm the ‗refugee 
regime‖ (1995: 495).   
Eritrean refugees, like all others, must navigate the transnational refugee regime, but they 
operate within another transnational field as well: that of the politics and organizations that have 
characterized Eritrea‘s global diaspora for decades (Hepner 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009a, b; see also 
Hepner and Conrad 2005; Bernal 2005).  In this chapter, I discuss the first transnationalism, that 
of the refugee regime that Eritreans encounter immediately upon crossing the border into 
Ethiopia.  I also explore the conflicts within the institutions that comprise the transnational 
refugee regime and the battlefields upon which refuges have to fight for protection and 
resettlement. 
In Ethiopia, the government manages refugees within the country.  This is the case for 
refugees from all foreign nations, for because of its global position Ethiopia is a highly trafficked 
receiving country for refugees from Kenya, Somalia, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea, to name only the 
closest refugee producing countries (UNHCR 2007b, 2008b).  Ethiopia claims that they house 
and support over 200,000 refugees (Interview with ARRA protection officer, May 18, 2008) not 
including unregistered refugees living illegally or integrated into the surrounding community.  In 
order to have some control over these populations, and to manage the effect they have on citizens 
of Ethiopia, the government monitors all refugee activity.  They further place some restrictions 
of the human rights of refugees, much as Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005) discuss for the 
case of refugees in Ugandan and Kenyan camps, such as the right to move freely throughout the 
country and the opportunity to work.  The Ethiopian government has also made participation in 
political organizations illegal for any refugee.  By limiting these rights, the government likely 
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believes it is able to protect the work opportunities and safety of its own citizens, but it does not 
make local integration possible, nor does it allow refugees to live in any state but limbo. As 
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond stated with respect to refugees in Uganda and Kenya, ―failures in 
protection of refugees resulted from a complex combination of bad polices, bureaucratic 
dysfunctions, and ossified modi operandi…The dysfunctions and misperceptions that led to the 
adoption and implementation of [these policies] by UNHCR and humanitarian organizations will 
be viewed as the tragic accident of history‖ (2005: 338). 
In order to manage refugee camps and the other circumstances of refugee life, the 
government has created an official organization, charged with the monumental task of 
registering, processing and monitoring refugees.  This organization, the Agency for Refugee and 
Returnee Affairs, or ARRA, has ―invited‖ UNHCR and IRC into Ethiopia to participate in the 
refugee regime.  ARRA runs refugee camps, such as Shimelba, and UNCHR operates in the role 
of a contractor, who together with ARRA, provides services and works toward a ―durable 
solution.‖   It also interacts with international governments for resettlement opportunities and 
humanitarian aid. 
ARRA and UNHCR: Working together for refugees in Ethiopia 
UNHCR‘s mandate states that as a non-governmental body, its responsibilities include 
lead[ing] and co-ordinate[ing] international action to protect refugees and resolve 
refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and 
well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to 
seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the option to return home 
voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country. [UNHCR website, 




Much as it does in other countries, UNHCR works as an advocate for refugees, appealing to third 
countries for resettlement only after the first two durable solutions, repatriation and integration, 
have been deemed impossible (see Chapter IV for an in-depth discussion of durable solutions), 
and by offering protection hours when an individual does not feel that ARRA‘s protection hours 
are an appropriate or safe place to discuss security problems. For this reason, UNHCR is seen as 
a less biased outlet for refugee stress, and theoretically, can protect refugees from problems they 
have with Ethiopian government officials, as will be discussed below. 
In May 2008, UNHCR and ARRA together released a ―10 point plan of action‖ in order 
to compel onward migration, out of Ethiopia, (and ostensibly, to stop utilizing UNHCR 
resources) and to create a collaborative force in the field of ―mixed migration‖ in Ethiopia 
(UNHCR 2007a).  Mixed migration is migration for more reasons than a well-founded fear of 
persecution, such as Ethiopians moving to developed nations for economic reasons.  Economic 
migrants account for most of the global migration, yet these types of migrants are kept out of 
resettlement programs because they do not fit the strict political definition of refugees, as per the 
1951 and 1967 conventions (Malkki 1995; Fullerton 2006).  Because the migrants that end up 
needing support during their journeys, and at international borders, not only includes political 
refugees, internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and ―other persons of interest‖ (such as stateless 
people, people in ―refugee-like situations,‖ and asylum seekers), UNHCR has had to develop 
goals to compel this other type of migration onward in a safe fashion and with cooperation from 
the community of African States (UNHCR 2007b).  These goals include shoring up cooperation 
among UNHCR, the African Union and the European Union, and the Ethiopian government 
(UNHCR 2008a, and b).  By increasing the services for other types of migration and 
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implementing policy (such as the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, African Common 
Position on Migration and Development and the Joint AU-EU Declaration on Migration, all 
adopted in 2006) they hope to create more channels and foster safer, more effective patterns of 
migration so that the refugee regime is not bogged down with people who do not fit the 
definition of refugees (UNHCR 2007a).  This is a politically strategic move, especially in the 
face of reports that Ethiopian nationals had actually registered at Shimelba and were resettled as 
Eritrean refugees (Interviews with EB and LL, May 25, 2008 and June 3, 2008).  These types of 
policy mandates and reports are common in many refugee camps, especially when resettlement 
opportunities are rare, as they are in most refugee crises. Verdirame and Harrell-Bond illustrate 
that in the cases of Kenya and Uganda, the most implementable durable solution is local 
integration, for resettlement offers are quite low, and repatriation is usually impossible (2005). 
Because of multifocal policies and the interests of Ethiopian citizens, as well as the influx 
of refugees from around the Horn of Africa, the role that ARRA plays in the everyday lives of 
Eritrean refugees is understandably complex.  The organization is working to manage the 
hundreds of thousands of refugees within their borders, while dealing with individual protection 
issues of refugees, working within the larger policy framework to create a comprehensive joint 
information campaign with the other policy and management actors, and appealing to Western 
nations for resettlement.  The Western nations that are currently accepting Eritrean refugees in 
high numbers are the United States, Canada and Australia (Interview with Louise Aubin, 
UNHCR, May 18, 2008), requiring further policy coordination with these countries. 
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Tensions with ARRA and UNHCR 
There are significant problems of trust between refugees and these bureaucratic 
organizations, as evidenced in the following statement made by a refugee in an interview: 
F: I was working with [a UNHCR protection officer as a translator], and there was 
a lot of problem appear after I am working with him by ARRA.  The ARRA make 
a problem on my life.  They asked me what the peoples told to the protection 
officer [from UNHCR]. And I told to ARRA I am not willing to speak what the 
refugee told to protection because I make a promise.  And they make a problem 
on my life.  Before that, even I live in the camp just like house arrest.  I cannot go 
out after 8 pm.   
 
LHG: Why do you think they treated you like that? 
 
F: Because I am not willing to speak what the refugee say to the protection 
officer. They expect that the refugee criticize the government of Ethiopia and 
when they criticized, ―Tell us,‖ the ARRA said to me.  They make a problem on 
my life.  Anyway, I am so much, I am in disaster when I was in the camp…They 
ask as I remember someone when I do his interview, his name is ----, he was in 
problem when he was in Ethiopia – he was tortured by the government of 
Ethiopia.  They know, ARRA what they were doing on him when he was 
interviewed in the Canadian embassy, he is in Canada now.  When I am out that 
interview, they already arrested me and took me to Axum for a week to ask what 
he‘s saying in interview.  He‘s tortured in Ma‘kalawi, that‘s why I‘m not willing 
to speak about him and about what he‘s saying in interview.  [Interview with F., 
May 28, 2008] 
 
Like UNCHR, ARRA has protection officers who meet with refugees to discuss their 
individual cases, and deal with security issues, should they arise.  However, unlike UNHCR, 
who employs a number of foreign protection officers in addition to Ethiopian workers (UNHCR 
2008b), ARRA, as an arm of the governmental body, employs Ethiopians only. Therefore, when 
refugees interface with ARRA in interviews, or when seeking a pass permit, they are interacting 
with Ethiopian nationals.   In fact, the identity and nationality of the officers completely affected 
the way refugees perceived them, regardless of which agency they worked for: 
As I know, when [the UNHCR protection officer was American] we believe 
UNHCR because he‘s an outsider, he‘s an American, he‘s not involved in 
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Ethiopian politics.  He‘s not making something wrong for refugee, he‘s coming to 
protect refugee.  So, before some days --- [an Ethiopian hired as a UNHCR 
protection officer], she‘s Ethiopian, and I also work with her for 2 weeks or 3 
weeks. But most of the refugees are not willing to work with her because she‘s an 
Ethiopian.  They hide their problems because she‘s an Ethiopian.  I don‘t know in 
detail, they say refugee, she has interact, she has some linkage with ARRA.  The 
refugees expect it. That‘s why they are not willing to speak the detail of their 
problems.  Anyway, we suspect, but we don‘t know that.  We think she have 
some interaction with ARRA. [Interview with F, May 28, 2008]. 
 
In their study of UNHCR policies and protection issues in two refugee camps in Kenya 
and Uganda, Verdirame and Harrell-Bond discovered a similar pattern, wherein refugees were 
reluctant to speak to UNHCR because of the political leanings and nationalities of some of their 
employees (2005: 67).  Further, there were rumors in Uganda and Kenya of breaches of 
confidentiality in the midst of missing files and unlocked offices (2005: 92).  Due to the history 
of the Eritrean struggle for independence and current regional political problems, the fact that 
ARRA primarily oversees refugee administration fosters and reinforces the mistrust Eritreans 
have for the Ethiopian government officials they must answer to.  This is further compounded by 
the fact that ARRA covertly (but not secretly) supports certain Eritrean opposition groups, which 
may or may not threaten individual Eritrean refugees. Telling the details of one‘s flight and 
abuse at the hands of other Eritreans may not feel like a safe thing to do, and negatively colors 
the experience of refugeehood in Ethiopia.  
The threats to refugees made by Eritrean political organizations supported covertly by the 
Ethiopian government via ARRA are used as ammunition for increasing membership to the 
Eritrean opposition groups, as well as political weight in the transnational opposition networks.  
As it has been reported to me in interviews and informal discussions with nearly fifty Eritrean 
refugees, members of the Eritrean opposition groups that gain support from ARRA are able to 
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have more legal freedoms within Ethiopia, and use this power to have great influence, sometimes 
illegal, over other refugees who are still working for personal independence from politics 
(Interviews with KL, June 14, 2008 and CZ, June 15, 2008). The following exchanges, quoted at 
length for their richness, illustrates how this is the case: 
LHG:  Well, do you think the opposition groups present problems for the people? 
 
CZ:  I have criticism in different directions.  First one is, most of the time they 
recruit minors.  And sometimes they hurt us people whom they think are kind of 
having different opinion to theirs.  And the third thing that I many times face, is 
sometimes they frighten people, sometimes they tell you as if they can do 
whatever they need over you, that they can kidnap you, and I saw them 
kidnapping people, that is someone who took different opinion, so they take him, 
and he was kidnapped by four or five men because their opinion was different.  
And there are, you know, occasions, I personally get frightened myself.  They 
warned me, you know?  If we even think, you name some information that you 
know about us, how do we know his involvement?  Even, I don‘t know.  I am not 
trying to exaggerate.  There were times when we were kind of having big 
conversation with group, and they were openly telling me, they can do whatever 
they want.  If they think, or they hear something about you, that can blackmail or 
can help to their movement, or their relationship with, especially with the 
Ethiopian government. [Interview with CZ, June 14, 2008] 
 
LHG:  So what was your experience when you crossed the border?  Were you 




KC:  Yeah.  Definitely.  They took me to Enda Baguna, and the saddest thing in 
my life happened there.  When they interview me, I – I don‘t know, told them 
about my father, then they know me, that I am the son of—yeah.  So they keep on 
asking my father‘s activity in Eritrea—what‘s he doing, and what your older 
brother is doing, he made a lot of bad things when he was in Ethiopia—So, you 
have to correct your father‘s mistakes.  You have to correct the mistakes your 
father committed when he was in Ethiopia.  So it‘s better for you to join the 
opposition political parties, because you have a special background in the 
opposition political parties.  If you join us, it‘s easy for you to get a comfortable 
life, and they said, we guarantee you, you‘re going to get a scholarship in Europe.  
If you join us earlier.  Because we don‘t have a lot of manpower, so you, 
especially educated people, you have to help us. 
  
                                                        
4 Enda Baguna is the processing center near the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Both ARRA and UNHCR 
have offices in the town, and refugee registration is carried out there before newcomers are transported to Shimelba. 
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LHG:  Was this the Ethiopian government, or this was an opposition group itself? 
 
KC:  Yeah, the Ethiopian government officials introduce me to opposition 
political parties, who just residing around Enda Baguna.  There are a lot of 
opposition political parties, a lot of them around Enda Baguna.  So they asked me 
to join them, and I said no.  Because I don‘t want to repeat the mistakes my father 
committed.  Because of his participation in politics, my whole family suffered a 
lot. [Interview June 14, 2008] 
 
In addition to legal support, ARRA also gives ideological, financial and material support 
to opposition groups and their members, and as can be seen through the above quotes, this has 
detrimental effects on refugees and lingering repercussions of trust and mistrust between 
refugees and ARRA.  This is a confounding factor for people who must, by the nature of their 
dependent position, and because of local policy, interact with the Ethiopian government.   
It is also a tense issue for individuals who agreed to speak with me.  ARRA had said that 
they would furnish me with participants for my interviews, and an office to work out of.  I 
questioned this from the beginning, because I believed that any refugee handpicked by the 
ARRA office would not be representative of the Shimelba population, and that being inside an 
ARRA compound would keep people from feeling comfortable and safe talking to me.  
However, ARRA did monitor my movement through the camp and compiled a list of those 
people I spoke with.  Every evening, after I had gone back within the walls of the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC) compound where I was staying, ARRA sent officers out to question 
people about which cafes I had been in, who I had been seen speaking to and who I walked with.   
It was a tense period for people who were interested in speaking with me.  We had many 
discussions about what may happen after I left, and who might be called into the ARRA office to 
be asked detailed questions about the nature of the research.  Often, the people who were 
working as ARRA ―investigators‖ were members of certain opposition groups.  The conflict that 
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this created for people, like CZ and KC, above, who were participating in my research, or who 
had been ―asked‖ to join an opposition group but had refused, is understood when we realize that 
these are the same people who have to rely on ARRA for protection while in Ethiopia.  
LHG:  After you said no to the opposition groups, what happened to you? 
 
KC:  Yeah, they keep on asking me, you have to participate.  I said no!  And I 
asked them to send me back to the camp.  They said okay, we will send you, but 
you have to, you have to listen what we said.  Because that is easy for you.  
Otherwise, you know, they keep on bothering me.  I will tell you what happened 
after I returned to the camp.  They sent me to the camp and when I arrived in the 
camp, almost after one month, my name was posted in the JVA list.
5
  Everybody 
knows, even the committee knows that.  Then, I am asked to return to Enda 
Baguna, after I [have been here for one month].  Then I return to Enda Baguna.  
And they said just—people, one of my friends, they directly informed UNHCR 
about my situation, then the ARRA officials told UNHCR that, he didn‘t complete 
his interview when he was in Enda Baguna, so we want him to finish his 
interview.  So that‘s why they are taking me.  Then, I was there for five days, and 
they ask me again and again to join the opposition political parties.  I keep on 
saying no, keep on saying no.  Then, because of my not accepting their idea, I had 
some negative relationship with ARRA officials.  And they keep on bothering me 
all the time…And I fear a lot, because I spent a lot of time with you, maybe you 
will see what will happen when you left.  Because I keep on wondering that.  
Keep on—yeah, I don‘t know what to say.  All of UNHCR officials, this 
including A-, she is senior protection officer, she knows every detail of my case, 
every situation of my case.  I keep on informing her my every situation and she‘s 
trying to do something but, she did almost nothing for me except giving me a 
hope.  ―I will try to do something for you, I will try,‖ but no nothing yet.  And I 
am here for almost four years, every day [a situation].  And my case was known 
by the Ethiopian protection officer, she was around for the last nine months.  
Ethiopian assistant protection officer.  UNHCR.  So she knows…my case and she 
told me that—she told me that the ARRA car would pass me by.  That‘s right. 
 
LHG:  Do you want to not be recording this? 
 
KC:  Why not?  I believe you.  And she told me that [I was bad-mouthing the 
Ethiopian government and it was not okay for me to do that].  She told me that.  
                                                        
5 The Joint Voluntary Association (JVA) is a branch of the US refugee system which conducts interviews with 
refugees who have been cleared for resettlement by UNHCR.  Names are posted in lists in a central area of 
Shimelba, notifying people that they are to leave camp and go to a nearby town where JVA conducts interviews with 
refugees in order to determine if they are eligible for resettlement to the US and refer them to the Department of 
Homeland Security for the final interview before transit to the US. 
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But I told her that, ―this is my situation, whether you accept it or not, this is my 
life.  I am contacting you because I have no choice.  You are the one, UNHCR 
delegates.  I don‘t want to contact you, but I am contacting you because I have no 
choice.‖  So, she told me that ―okay, I will try to do something,‖ but she did 
almost nothing.  She told me that [my] case is pending— [I am] making a bad 
mouth, just what [I]‘ve said is not right.  And you are not supposed to say this 
kind of things about Ethiopian government officers.  One day I asked her…, ―are 
you for UNHCR, or Ethiopian government?‖  She say ―both.‖  Well?  Almost my 
case is very strong, but she deliberately, deliberately put it aside for a long time.  
And now I‘m just trying my best to reason [with the] American protection officer.  
I don‘t know what he will do, but I think he might do something, I don‘t know.  
But still I am nearly every day at risk, and I don‘t know what to say.  I feel so sad. 
[Interview June 14, 2008] 
 
 Therefore, distrust of ARRA has been developing for some time now, leaving refugees 
little choice but to keep their problems to themselves until they have the opportunity to speak 
with someone at UNHCR. As one refugee put it, ―Trust is uh, it has degrees.  To the maximum 
you trust maybe God or yourself.  But as long as you‘re asking me about the degree, to some 
extent, it differs the degree‖ (Interview with TL, May 29, 2008).  Hynes outlines the caveats of 
trust and mistrust between refugees, staff members and researchers and we see that there are 
layers of trust that cannot be permeated by outsiders, just as many refugees do not feel that they 
can trust other refugees, for identities and associations are always changing (2003). 
 UNHCR also employs Ethiopians at many levels of their system.  Of the 188 staff 
members UNHCR lists in Ethiopia, 131 of them are Ethiopian (UNHCR 2008a).  Granted, many 
of these Ethiopians are support staff, not protection officers or policy makers, however one 
protection officer that had been in Shimelba before my arrival was Ethiopian, and many 
complaints were lodged against her perceived inability to remain neutral and confidential in the 




LHG:  So do you think there‘s a problem with national staff, in the NGO‘s and 
international agencies here? 
 
KC:  Especially the UNHCR protection officer.  Now, she‘s not around.  How an 
organization like UNHCR puts a national officer here, even I can‘t understand.  I 
don‘t know.  I don‘t know about the other officers, but I have a lot of resentment 
with that Ethiopian lady. [Interview, June 14, 2008] 
 
 This impediment continues today in the form of interpreting, both in Shimelba and in the 
Ugandan and Kenyan camps that Verdirame and Harrell-Bond were observing: ―the refugees 
feared that UNHCR‘s interpreter was associated with the...government.  The forced intimacy, 
especially in the camps, with persons who had been strangers to each other before often aroused 
fears‖ (2005: 67).  They went on to describe a situation in which an interpreter was found to be 
misinterpreting refugee accounts, with detrimental effects to the refugee population in Nairobi.  
In the past, Eritreans were given the opportunity to bring their own interpreters when meeting 
with UNHCR employees.  Eventually, UNHCR began employing camp residents to translate 
during meetings and interviews (Interview with Louise Aubin, UNHCR, June 24, 2008; 
interview with TL, June 2, 2008 and interview with KC, June 14, 2008).  Because secondary and 
university education in Eritrea is conducted in English, there are many people in the camp who 
speak excellent English and have the trust of their peers in the camp.  This approach seemed to 
make everyone happy for some time.  However, one of my participants had worked as a 
translator for UNHCR and an arm of the US resettlement organization, the Joint Voluntary 
Organization, JVA. As he‘d heard so many of the stories of other refugees, he became a veritable 
storehouse of knowledge, claims against the government and information about protection issues 
that had arisen in Ethiopia.  This knowledge, in turn, led him to be targeted by certain opposition 
group members to reveal the identities of the refugees for whom he had interpreted and the 
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details of their stories.  He was so concerned about the repercussions of his knowledge that he 
was unwilling to speak on the record about his special case beyond the following statement: ―I‘m 
not working with ARRA.  Uh, and I‘m not working with UNHCR.  If you have to work you have 
to be paid.  I‘m just helping.  I‘m helping UNHCR, I‘m helping ARRA, especially I‘m helping 
the refugee‖ (Interview with TL, June 3, 2008).   
Because of reports such as this one, UNCHR has begun employing only Ethiopians as 
interpreters.  Eritreans take issue with this, though: firstly, they note the loss of income by those 
working as translators, in a world where making a meager $20 a month can mean the difference 
between eating and not eating.  Secondly, Eritreans claim that there has been a shift in language 
patterns between Tigrinya speakers in Eritrea and Tigrinya speakers in Northern Ethiopia.  They 
claim that the Eritrean president, Isayas Afwerki, has initiated this shift in order to accentuate the 
uniqueness of Eritrea, and the Eritrean ―ethnic‖ identity that has been developing since 
independence (Hepner 2000).  Therefore, it would be the case that if vocabulary, accent and 
grammar usage have shifted, local Ethiopians are not capable of interpreting.  There are also 
reports that these Ethiopian translators are intentionally misinterpreting what is said in 
interviews, thereby glossing over events that Eritrean refugees deem very significant to their 
resettlement chances.  UNHCR says that they have done some investigations into these claims 
and have determined that the language has not shifted significantly on the other side of the 
border and that they have deemed that the local translators are fully capable of translating 
accurately (Interview with Louise Aubin, UNHCR, June 24, 2008).  Further, it is their 
responsibility to ensure refugee protection, and therefore offering a refugee a position which puts 
him at risk for knowing too much is outside the bounds of permissible organizational behavior. 
45 
 
Expectations and Disappointments: Coping with the Refugee Regime 
Another perceived conflict between refugees and Ethiopian UNHCR employees is 
exemplified by a meeting I observed in Addis Ababa between a refugee and an Ethiopian man 
employed as an intake officer at UNHCR.  I had been given permission to sit in on protection 
hours for refugees who were part of my research.  We arrived at the UNHCR compound at 
7:30am and there was already a huge crowd of refugees from many different countries waiting to 
see protection officers.  The man I was with explained to the guard that I was a researcher, and 
we were brought in immediately, where the protection officer received us and allowed me to 
observe the following interactions.  The protection officer we were meeting with was an 
Ethiopian; the back and forth that ensued between these two men was veiled, and contained 
incredible amounts of parrying, which the refugee explained to me when we left the UNHCR 
compound.  Never did the refugee speak his truth openly, nor did he clearly discuss the 
protection issues he was having that inspired the trip to UNHCR that day, and both men clearly 
entered the conversation with preconceived notions about the agendas of the other.  This was 
clear from the conversations I‘d had earlier with the refugee, and the ways in which the 
protection officer described his job to me at the beginning of the meeting.  In fact, the refugee 
told me that he demanded (whether this is an advisable strategy or not remains to be seen) to 
speak with the senior protection officer in the location, for he was not willing to tell his story to 
anyone else, especially an Ethiopian.  He was concerned about his safety and the fact that his 
application for resettlement had been sent t o JVA in Nairobi for processing over a year previous, 
yet nothing had come of it.
6
  He worried that some details of his case had been leaked and that 
                                                        
6 After refugees have completed interviews with UNHCR, and UNHCR determines that they are eligible for 
resettlement to the US, their case files are transferred to the Joint Voluntary Agency in Nairobi.  If JVA determines 
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his future had been laid by the wayside for political motives as the opposition groups were 
forming a new alliance.  Because of his knowledge of many other refugees‘ cases, he was 
concerned about his safety, especially due to the nature of these cases and the relationship they 
had to the Ethiopian government and illicit political activity.  The Ethiopian protection officer 
was not willing to acquiesce to his request, and sent the refugee out of the office, without so 
much as allowing the refugee one last chance to explain his case.  Witnessing this exchange, 
though it was mainly in Tigrinya, with intermittent English for my benefit, made it clear that 
refugees do not have a voice and are not trusted, even at UNHCR.  Without the ensured 
neutrality of these kinds of officers, the refugees have every right to feel guarded and suspicious, 
especially when they have cases that they believe to be so complicated.  Because of the rumors 
floating around the population about mistreatment at the hands of protection officers and abuse 
and corruption within the system, the refugees are understandably mistrustful of any Ethiopian 
they encounter in positions of power within the system.  It is also germane to consider these 
issues and their presence in narratives made by other refugees: in the above statement by KC, in 
which he talks about the interrelation of ARRA, Ethiopian nationality and opposition groups, we 
see intricate webs of interconnectivity and the manners in which the refugee regime permeates 
the shadows of illicit and illegal workings.   
However, because of the power hierarchy within UNHCR and the relationship between 
UNHCR and ARRA, it is disadvantageous when refugees refuse to tell their stories: they need 
assistance from many UNHCR employees as they pass through the refugee regime and a single 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
that everything is in order after reviewing the file, the refugees are interviewed outside Shimelba, in nearby cities of 
Shire, Shiraro or Axum.  The refugees still have one final interview to complete with the US Department of 
Homeland Security (Interview with Louise Aubin, June 24, 2008, interview with TL, June 2, 2008 and interview 
with KC, June 14, 2008). 
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protection officer will not be able to help them each time they have protection issues or 
resettlement questions.  Without opening their circles of trust, they may feel as though they are 
protecting themselves, but they are not creating an environment within which they are likely to 
have more success.  Further, UNHCR deals with so many refugees in Ethiopia, that it must be 
difficult for them to see refugees as individuals with individual needs and pressing security 
concerns.  In Uganda, Verdirame and Harrell-Bond found that ―negative stereotyping of refugees 
as ‗liars‘ or ungrateful ‗free-riders‘ trying to take advantage of humanitarian assistance 
proliferated among‖ INGO staff (2005: 89).  Thieman-Dino and Schechter further discuss that it 
is imperative to listen to refugee voices and individual experiences, and that we can better ―meet 
the needs of refugees, and refugees themselves can participate more directly in reforming both 
the policies and practices that impact (sic) them‖ (2004:83).  I argue that through an 
unwillingness to speak, refugees are erasing their individuality and can only be seen as another 
face within the group.  It is important though, to remain aware that this is still an exercise of 
choice and agency within a system that is hardly impervious to political machinations of locals.  
Refugees are attempting to mitigate the ways that regional politics infect the putatively ―neutral‖ 
refugee regime.   
In the cases of refugees speaking up to UNHCR, they do not see good results.  One of my 
interview subjects was a man who had worked as an interpreter for UNHCR.  During his time 
working with the organization, he realized that there was a scandal afoot: Ethiopians were 
traveling to the border, and telling border guards that they were Eritrean and were refugees.  At 
Enda Baguna, they were registered, given ration cards, and put in the master list of people who 
are hoping for resettlement.  The refugee I was interviewing found out that an ARRA officer was 
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coordinating this scam and asked the Eritrean interpreters ―please keep very confidential‖ 
(Interview with F, May 30, 2008).  He reported how he revealed to UNHCR that ARRA was 
knowingly registering Ethiopians as Eritreans for resettlement and UNHCR‘s response that 
because they are in a professional relationship with ARRA, they must therefore trust ARRA‘s 
staff members‘ actions.  Thus he lost more and more trust for the organization and its employees: 
H: So I can‘t say you that every UNHCR officer is responsible for problems…In 
the UNHCR there is some problems, really.  There is not enough accountability.  
There is some, something like a lot of freedoms, any person can be maker or 
breaker of your life.  So, I hate that.  And thus I hate that UNHCR is sometimes a 
wrongly organization.  But there are a lot of people also in the UNHCR who think 
deeply, and who [conduct] their lives for the benefit of refugees.  But they do not 
get enough time to work on that organization. [Interview, May 30, 2008] 
 
The men who I have quoted in this chapter, Henok, who experienced corruption 
in the ARRA office; Tedi, who was mis-served by the UNHCR officer; and Cornelios 
and Johnny, who were coerced into joining the opposition networks through their 
connections to ARRA, are only some of the Eritrean refugees who have experienced 
mistreatment at the hands of the very protection officers who are tasked with delivering 
human rights protection and resettlement opportunities. 
LHG:  And overall, how do you feel about UNHCR and ARRA? 
 
KC:  I feel so sad, and so angry about UNHCR—He, I don‘t know, the 
organization is working a little, but not the way we expected it to do.  I don‘t 
know, I don‘t know what to say.  But I am not totally happy.  I am totally 
unhappy.  I am not happy. 
 
LHG:  Do you trust anyone in these organizations, or do you feel like when you 
talk to them, you have to tell your story in certain ways to protect your sensitive 
case? 
 
KC:  Definitely.  After that occasion with the Ethiopian protection officer, I [fear] 
so—I am not happy to talk all my situations with anybody.  Almost you are the 
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first person to tell it, every detail.  Because you know, she told me that I am 
working for both, so how can I trust her? 
 
LHG:  How do you feel about having to tell your story—when you tell your story 
to people you don‘t trust, how do you feel about having to ask them for help 
without being able to be honest with them? 
 
KC:  I know it will affect me, because unless and otherwise I told them my real 
situation, I know it can hurt me, or not helping me good.  Because I otherwise I 
say all detail of my cases.  But the first thing that matters for me that my safety.  
Not where to live and where to go, in order to get or fulfill my vision, I have to 
stay alive.  That makes me somehow—I don‘t know.  My rule is safety first, life.  
I have to survive.  Then, I don‘t know, something good may come, or it may not.  
I don‘t know. 
 
LHG:  How does this experience with UNHCR and ARRA and being here in 
Shimelba, how does this affect the way you think about your rights? 
 
KC:  Almost I lost my confidence.  I was a strong person, and I had a lot of 
visions.  But because of this stupid organization, I feel so underestimated and 
undermined, so I don‘t know.  Just I feel pessimistic all the time.  Because 
somebody just deciding on my life.  I am not the one who is responsible for my 
life. [Interview June 14, 2008] 
 
Many of the Eritrean refugees I spoke with, in both Addis Ababa and Shimelba explained 
what their expectations of the resettlement system were.  They expected to be received in 
Ethiopia by unbiased, international workers.  They had hoped that the Ethiopian government was 
not a part of the equation, for the simple fact that Eritreans projected that there would be trust 
and mistrust issues between themselves and Ethiopians.  They further expected the ability to live 
freely in Ethiopia as they had never been able to in Eritrea, while waiting for resettlement to a 
Western country. Though some of them were aware of the conditions in Shimelba ahead of time, 
for the most part, Eritreans had not heard about the complications the Shimelba population was 
facing.  They were delighted, much as I was, to see the cafes, movie theaters and bars in 
Shimelba, which created a period of relief upon arrival.  The development of the camp into its 
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own mini-city is disorienting, in that it makes the settlement seem permanent; the population 
may also seem content to remain in the desert, as though they are not in need of services from the 
Ethiopian government and NGOs.  However, the young refugees who are so eager to be resettled 
to other countries found the buildings and generators and businesses to be a tease (Interview with 
NA, May 22, 2008) and ultimately, the establishment of commerce in Shimelba became a 
confounding factor to the temporary nature of refugee camp habitation.  However, as visitors to 
Shimelba, foreign workers are reminded that the establishment of semi-permanent homes and 
businesses is the result of remittances and work ethic of Eritreans, not aid from ARRA or 
UNHCR (Interview with Shimelba Central Committee, June 12, 2008).  Many refugees are 
concerned that UNHCR does not see how deeply their need runs, and cannot address their 
problems unless they are resettled quickly.   
However, despite services UNHCR offers for protection, they cannot resettle refugees 
without coming to agreements with foreign governments who choose to accept refugees.  
UNHCR‘s limitations become problematic because refugees are not informed as to what 
UNHCR policy and decision-making abilities are, in either institutional operations, or as 
individuals working for an INGO.  Though they do rely on UNHCR to be their liaison to foreign 
governments who may be accepting refugees for resettlement, the Eritreans in Ethiopia believe 
that there are speedy channels through the transnational refugee regime, and that there are certain 
keywords to facilitate processing through the system.  When, as in recent years, UNHCR was 
only able to resettle a small number of Eritreans to receiving countries, mainly from the ―old 
caseload‖ of Eritreans who arrived at the front end of the renewed migration (UNHCR 2008b), 
the refugees interviewed for this process become suspicious of UNHCR operations.  Refugees 
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expect that UNHCR will address each of them as an individual, keep their cases confidential, 
process them without delays and acquire resettlement quickly.  UNHCR does not stall 
resettlement opportunities for refugees.  In fact, they have continued time-case and special-case 
resettlement during the lead up to the group resettlement, and as such, are still resettling refugees 
individually as they finish the interview process, even though the group resettlement process will 
likely draw less scrutiny for individuals.
7
  However, some refugees wonder what has slowed 
their cases, as evidenced in this message I received: ―lily, i have done DHS interview but they 
calling again to do. why they called me i don't know. And i have again interview on monday. i 
am answerd (sic) well my questions. but what they call me again i don't know‖ (Email 
communication from BL, February 21, 2008).   
It is stressful for refugees to wonder what is preventing them from progressing through 
the resettlement process.  They understand the time-case process as though they have been 
registered and will be resettled in clustered groups, and expect to be interviewed at the same time 
as their cohorts.  The effects of knowing and not knowing have been explored by Caruth (1996), 
and when compounded with loss of trust, and unfulfilled expectations, and most importantly, the 
traumatic events that precipitated flight, I must wonder what the repercussions of having no 
control over one‘s future are.  There remain no mental health services available for refugees in 
Ethiopia.   
It becomes clear then, after listening to refugees talk about UNHCR in Ethiopia, that they 
have expectations of the system and the individuals who work within that system that are not 
                                                        
7 Time-case resettlement is a first come, first served resettlement process, in which UNHCR resettles refugees who 
have arrived in Shimelba longest ago first.  According to my field notes, this process had reached those refugees 
who have arrived in about 2002 during my time in Ethiopia.  Special-case resettlement removes the time 
line/hierarchy of resettlement.  People who have security issues or ―special cases‖ are resettled as quickly as 
possible so that their protection can be prioritized. 
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realistic.  Rooted in the absence of information about UNHCR and their mandate, these 
expectations and a lack of understanding about what UNHCR is capable of (be it due to their 
mandate, regional politics, funding, or man-hours) leads to high levels of frustration and 
disappointment.  These conditions in turn lead to paranoia, mistrust and eventually, may result in 
surrender manifested either as admitting powerlessness to the system, or fleeing the system 
altogether and attempting to access the developed world by foot through Sudan and Libya.   
The policies are constantly being updated, but implementation of the policies seems to 
have stagnated within the pluralistic political and social fields because the global North fails to 
contribute enough funding and resettlement opportunities.  The ability of refugees to understand 
how to navigate the system is dependent on the functioning of their information networks, which 
pass on stories of how government and NGO agents operate.  These information networks also 
convey stories of trust and mistrust.  However, the increased ―understanding‖ of the system leads 
to a certain kind of navigation that is not necessarily productive, as evidenced by the meeting of 
the refugee with the Ethiopian UNHCR agent described earlier.  Yet, it still illustrates how 
refugees strive to be recognized as persons, and strive to make choices within a system that is 
compromised by many limitations and political interferences.   
Thematizing: Navigating the Interview Process 
 Another mode through which refugees cope with the bureaucratic procedures of the 
refugee regime is in thematizing their narratives, so that they fit within the ―acceptable 
categories‖ for resettlement that Verdirame and Harrell-Bond noted in Uganda and Kenya (2005: 
88).  After speaking with many refugees in Ethiopia and asylum seekers who have already 
reached the US, I have concluded that there are many common themes in these personal history 
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narratives.  The commonalities become a strengthening force in compiling reports of conditions 
within Eritrea, especially as relates to human rights violations, for these commonalities are the 
result of patterned abuses themselves.  However, when one‘s interviews are analyzed for 
discrepancies, and specific experiences of an individual are seen as the basis for his future, an 
unwillingness to be forthcoming creates suspicion of refugees on the part of the interviewers.  
However, it is already clear that there are patterns of human rights abuses in Eritrea (Amnesty 
International 2008a, Human Rights Watch 2008, US State Department 2009).
8
   
 I have been told by agency employees that they notice themes in the narratives, which 
lead them to suspect that individuals are not presenting the truth in their claims (Interview with 
ARRA official, June 27, 2008).  These impressions are also evident among US asylum officers in 
the 2000 documentary Well-Founded Fear (Robertson and Camerini 2000).  If an individual is 
deemed not credible, it is protocol to throw his claim out, for it indicates that he is using the 
refugee regime to gain resettlement even though he may not harbor a well-founded fear of 
persecution.  The process by which a person may be denied resettlement maybe be a direct 
rejection from a receiving country, or it may be that the case ―falls through the cracks‖ and 
stagnates in the UNHCR processing center for there are no receiving countries that will accept 
the individual.  However, refugees are not always notified that there are discrepancies, or that 
their cases have been rejected, leaving them hanging in the lurch.   
During the interviews with representatives of the organizations from ARRA to UNHCR, 
to JVA and DHS, if there are discrepancies, whether from omission or lies, the case for 
                                                        
8 For refugees and asylum seekers to bear the ―burden of proof‖ of persecution, or to face being deemed ―non-
credible,‖ reveals Western, individualist bias in asylum procedure, where policy makers do not necessarily recognize 
socially widespread violence.  However, in this case, with Eritreans being accepted prima facie, they are relieved 
from the supplying information about their well-founded fear, and why they specifically were targeted.   
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resettlement may be thrown out.  It is therefore crucial to tell the truth, and maintain consistency.  
But who can determine what is ―the truth‖ and by what criteria do they determine truthfulness?  
Based on what I learned through many of my interviews, it seems that refugees do not intend to 
lie, for they tell only what they think is relevant to the interview.  Again, we see where policy 
leaves a loophole and operates through a power structure in which UNHCR, ARRA and US 
officers have the power to decide one‘s fate based on a feeling and that humanitarian workers 
feel that the credibility of refugees is undermined by their eagerness to be resettled (Verdirame 
and Harrell-Bond 2005: 89) must have detrimental effects on individuals‘ resettlement chances.  
Many young men told me that they had been called back to repeat certain stages of interviews 
(Interviews with TL (June 3, 2008), BL (June 28, 2008), KC (June 14, 2008), among others) and 
were concerned that this was because they had said or not said something crucial in their 
interviews.  One man said,  
you know what, there were two different interviews.  Security interview was so 
hard, you may sometimes change your story, and even the UNHCR interview, 
they were Ethiopians, you may not be truthful.  Sometimes you may hide 
something.  Just you tell them something and hide others.  I do that…I don‘t feel 
guilty.  I just want to make myself free, [they were] asking questions that doesn‘t 
make sense, which even I can‘t answer beyond my ability. [Interview with EB, 
May 27, 2008] 
 
It is impossible to document each case that does not result in resettlement, but it is significant 
that refugees believe that their cases are removed from the system, and that this may correspond 
to perceived thematizing in interviews.   
Occasionally, elements of stories would come up that were very specific: arrest at a 
public event, abuse of students in the student organization, well planned escape, and secret 
release by a sympathetic guard.  In some circumstances, these stories overlapped so much that it 
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seemed that I was hearing the same story.  I was unable, for confidentiality concerns, to 
specifically ask these participants if they had been together in Eritrea or had made the journey 
through the desert together, but I tried asking questions to determine if these two men had indeed 
been freed from a shipping container under gunfire together.  It remains unclear to me whether I 
was hearing about one event they both experienced, or whether one or both of them was telling 
me a synopsis of the refugee experience, thereby telling me what they thought I wanted to hear.  
An important conclusion I drew from conversations such as this is that the implications of this 
kind of storytelling in formal interviews during the resettlement process may not increase or rush 
resettlement, but it does explain how the information networks transfer certain kinds of 
information from refugee to refugee, and refugee to researcher.  Further, it highlights that there 
are systemic patterns of violations in Eritrea, and that this needs to be taken into account by the 
refugee regime and the West when creating immigration policies that put repatriation at the top 
of the list of durable solutions, that fail to offer as many resettlement opportunities as they are 
capable of, and that require asylum seekers to bear the burden of proof. 
As individual scenes from personal histories are included in the information networks and 
afforded the label ―successful,‖ they begin appearing more and more frequently in the personal 
narratives of others who are also hoping for success within the refugee regime and resettlement 
industry.  Unfortunately, this also calls the credibility of many refugee life histories into 
question.   
 The fact that personal narratives become mythologized as some individuals are not 
offered resettlement becomes problematic.  Because refugees do not have advocates and advisors 
explaining the system to them, they must themselves discern what ensures success in the system.  
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It is common for some refugees to repeat the narratives of others, for if this story was successful 
for one person, it must surely be successful for another, right?  As one asylee in the US stated in 
an interview with T. Hepner, ―Maybe it‘s not my story, but it is someone‘s story.‖ 
 Therefore, for an Eritrean refugee to wait in line for protection hours, only to tell the 
officer who meets with him that he‘s unwilling to reveal the details of his case to anyone but a 
certain UNHCR protection officer, will only stymie the claim of protection needs.  Yet this 
happens repeatedly.  The system is unable to accommodate the actual number of refugees who 
feel that they have ―special cases‖ and certainly will not behoove anyone who wants to reveal the 
details of his case only to a senior officer.  Despite their great compassion and extreme 
dedication to their work, the senior protection officers are not able to meet individually with 
refugees, and certainly cannot break protocol for refugees who do not trust other protection 
officers.   
 We see similar problems with UNHCR‘s opinion of refugees in Kenya: ―when faced with 
financial constraints, UNHCR staff ceases to see refugees as people with problems; instead 
refugees become the problem.  UNHCR‘s efforts in these situations focus on ‗eliminating the 
organizational problem (refugees)…Unfortunately, the organizational solution often leads to 
increased suffering and death‖ (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005: 35, emphasis in original).  
Any institutional structure that can, in times of stress, see refugees as the ―organizational‖ 
problem, must not be relied on to see refugees as individuals with complicated motives and who 
understandably veil their truths to protect themselves.  This problem is compounded by the 
depersonalization afforded to refugees through the system of prima facie acceptance.  
Individuals disappear into the crowd when organizational staff assumes that every new arrival 
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has undergone similar patterned experiences.  Though it is important to recognize that there are 
structures and patterns of violence at play inside Eritrea, it is equally important to give voice to 
the individual refugee at all stages of the process (Thieman-Dino and Schechter 2004).  In doing 
so, it is important to achieve a balance between individual and group, and to use the tension 
between these two perspectives.   
Unlike in Uganda and Kenya, the refugee regime in Ethiopia is designed to accept 
Eritreans prima facie, and thereby does not have the infrastructure in place to conduct status 
determination interviews or to accommodate the personal requests of nearly 20,000 individuals.
9
  
This may be the primary reason (coupled with the projected failure of other durable solutions and 
prolonged encampment in Shimelba) that UNHCR sought group resettlement for the residents of 
Shimelba.  The fact that refugees have expectations of the care they will receive from UNHCR, 
yet are consistently disappointed in their quest for recognition and speedy resettlement indicates 
that there is not broad knowledge among refugees of the system and the institutional capabilities 
of UNHCR.  For the refugees, without a comprehensive understanding of the structure of 
UNCHR, it must be even more difficult to navigate the ins and outs of a system that is shrouded 
in confusion.  Further, despite the fact that many of the refugees in question are educated 
urbanites, the international legal system that houses the refugee regime is an alien framework for 
Eritreans.  Surely, throughout years working in UNHCR sites, protection officers must begin to 
see all refugees as one refugee, one case, one great need.  If refugees begin telling the same 
story, or only relaying vagaries because of security concerns, this must only compound the 
                                                        
9 In order to determine if a person who has crossed an international border meets the definition of ―the refugee‖ 
(Malkki 1995), UNHCR and the Kenyan and Ugandan governments conduct status determination interviews before 




problem.  Though no ARRA or UNHCR employees told me they were cognizant of these 
phenomena, I observed the attitudes with which the interns and junior protection officers 
addressed refugees.  Verdirame and Harrell-Bond note that ―based most commonly on cursory 
interviews, decision making on asylum applications could hardly have been the result of a 
rational legal process.  Interviewers [in Kenya and Uganda] often relied on such non-legal 
categories as ‗impressions‘ in order to reach a decision‖ (2005: 96).  They go on to report that 
the tendency of UNHCR interviewers to make decisions about a refugee‘s truthfulness in mere 
minutes leads to a sense of power, omnipotence and infallibility that also exists among the 
UNHCR and ARRA officers in Ethiopia.   
Before Shimelba residents were given a Priority 2-group status to be resettled to the US, 
each person was dragged (or pushed) through the system as an individual.  The series of 
interviews, with ARRA, UNHCR, JVA and DHS, were mysterious experiences that people 
undertook on individual schedules.  At most, a small group of refugees were on similar interview 
schedules, and as such, could compare progress with one another.  The only knowledge a person 
may have had about this process in advance came from people who had gone through it.  The 
mystery veiling these processes led to certain tactics in responding to questions.  Coupled with 
the secrecy and lack of trust involved in reporting the conditions and circumstances that 
precipitate flight, truth-telling during these interviews became a tenuous thing, and many 
refugees felt that they are not safe, even during their interviews, to tell the truth.  Suspicions of 
corruption within the UNHCR system exacerbated these feelings, especially when the rumors 
included accusations that UNHCR knowingly registered Ethiopians as refugees and prioritized 
their resettlement, or that they put Ethiopians on planes to the US pretending to be Eritrean 
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refugees who had achieved resettlement.  Though there is no substantiating evidence for this type 
of scandal, these are possibly the worst things that UNHCR employees could do to upset 
refugees who desire resettlement so badly. As one refugee put it: 
No, I can‘t trust them.  Because the UNHCR by itself is a big organization, and 
there are different people there, so things might be corrupted, so we obviously see 
these things while I was stay in the camps, there are people who were supposed to 
be in the US or Canada and they are still there, so the former protection officer 
might be responsible for this.  The current one, it might be a puzzle for him, but 
you never know.  And the new comer will do the same things maybe, so there is a 
mis-doing of things there. [Interview with NI, May 27, 2008] 
 
The transnational and the local refugee regimes in Ethiopia are not infallible.  It is 
comprised of humans, working to manage the refugee problem in Ethiopia.  UNHCR is seeking 
durable solutions for the nearly 200,000 refugees within the Ethiopian borders, but remains a 
humanitarian organization, and will not take a position on the conditions that lead entire 
communities to take flight.  They offer protection hours, much as ARRA does, but are unable to 
give individual attention to everyone who requests it, either in Addis Ababa or Shimelba.  Yet 
refugees remain dependent on these organizations, despite the facts that they are mistrustful of 
one another, that there are complications with Ethiopian employees, and that there are trends in 
secrecy and thematizing that all afford disparaging effects to resettlement outcomes.  It is here 
that the intersection of the policies and human rights understanding occurs, a topic that will be 
considered in the final chapter on human rights consciousness.  I now turn to the experience of 
being a refugee, thrust into a community of friends and enemies, living in Shimelba and Addis 
Ababa, and being forced to navigate yet another transnationalism, that of the Eritrean diaspora.   
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Chapter IV: Experiencing Refugeehood: Urban and Encamped 
Refugees in Ethiopia 
 Becoming a refugee means that the displacement and separation from your former life 
permeates every action you take, every relationship you have.  For example, I accompanied one 
refugee to an internet café where he hoped to call his mother in Eritrea.  He hoped to find an 
internet place that had internet phone calling, so that the phone was logged into a computer site, 
given an American ID number, and could then call out to other countries.  This convoluted 
approach was necessary because both the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments block calls 
between the countries, and the governments own the phone companies.  He was also concerned 
about finding a calling location that would afford him some privacy, so that he did not have to 
speak Tigrinya with his mother in front of Ethiopian patrons, thereby giving away his identity.  
He had been given messages from refugees in Shimelba, where there is no access to telephones, 
to read to his mother so that she could relay them to other mothers, wives and family members 
still in Asmara.   
The money he used for the phone call, just $.10 US per minute, was from the savings he 
had been adding to for months, for he just opened a business in Shimelba, and had received a 
pass permit to Addis Ababa under the guise of collecting goods and making business 
arrangements with vendors there.  He did finally speak to his mother, and so did I, in my broken 
phrases of Tigrinya.  This task shows the complex entanglements of what life as a refugee can be 
like.  It illustrates mistrust of Eritreans towards Ethiopians, the problems of il/legal work and 
movement opportunities, the shape and significance of information networks, and the demands 
of transnational life, in a context of prolonged war and human rights violations.  In this chapter, I 
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will illustrate some of the circumstances that define the lived experience of being a refugee in 
Ethiopia.  I discuss patterns of trust and mistrust that permeate the refugee community, and why 
refugees choose to come to Ethiopia, or if there is a choice at all.  I also offer in-depth 
descriptions of urban and encamped refugee environment, and a description of the support 
system within Shimelba.  I continue by exploring UNHCR‘s durable solutions, and an emerging 
hierarchy of resettlement countries. 
Trust and Mistrust 
Eritrea and Ethiopia share an entangled history.  Due to the violence and dislocation  of 
the war for independence and the border war, nationals of both countries feel mistrust towards 
each other.  This mistrust is felt between individuals and between the governments, but 
complicates the fact that Eritrean refugees have been forced to flee to Ethiopia, where they feel 
that they are insecure.  Because of this history of hostility and because Eritrea and Ethiopia are at 
a standoff with each other, each country is concerned about infiltration by ―terrorist agents‖ from 
the other, sent by the government to destabilize its power or threaten its citizens.  Ethiopia, 
specifically, believes that Eritreans will target Ethiopian spaces for politically motivated attacks 
against civilians and government buildings.  For that reason, anytime there is a public disaster, 
Eritreans are considered to be the culprits, even before any evidence has been collected.   
One such event occurred while I was in Addis Ababa, spending time with Eritreans.  A 
mini bus had exploded and 13 people were killed.  Immediately, the press and the police 
assumed that Eritreans were necessarily behind the attack.  The area was immediately cordoned 
off, and ID cards were checked.  Anyone who was Eritrean was detained and questioned.  
Despite the fact that no terrorist group took responsibility for the attack, the idea that Eritrea was 
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responsible persisted, and had a lasting ripple effect on the permissions that Eritreans were 
granted for movement in and out of the capital city.  There were also complex ideas about 
conspiracy and intent.  For example, on the bus was an Israeli-American scholar who was a 
professor at Asmara University until his department was disbanded.  He had transferred to Addis 
Ababa University, and was thus seen by some to be a traitor to Eritrea, for he was now employed 
by an enemy of the Eritrean state.  Some of the Eritreans I spoke to were convinced that he was 
targeted in this attack and that that threat may have extended to anyone who worked with him at 
Asmara University, including some Eritreans who were recently accepted as his students at 
Addis Ababa University.   
 However, terrorist attacks are rare, and it is even rarer for Eritreans to claim 
responsibility for attacks.  It is the time between attacks that is interesting to look at.  The 
mistrust the Eritreans have for the Ethiopians with whom they have to interact permeates their 
entire social field.  They keep their nationality a secret, and thereby have to hide their pasts and 
their circumstances in Ethiopia; they must also be able to offer explanations for the hardships 
they face besides the fact that they are refugees.  In a region where poverty and hunger are the 
norm, people are accustomed to going without.  However, the Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia see 
their need as uncharacteristic, and are not comfortable with the fact that they need to rely on 
others for survival.  However, if they feel the need to keep their identities as Eritreans and 
refugees secret, they are also unable to let Ethiopians know why they are unable to afford food, 
clothing and services.  In keeping these facets of their lives clandestine, they are keeping parts of 
their identities secret.  The issues that these refugees face simply by trying to survive every day 
consumes their psyches; keeping these stresses private is taxing for them, and they are cognizant 
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of the fact that they have been forced into the shadows of the developing world (Hynes 2003; 
Interviews with TL and EB May 26, 2008). 
Why Ethiopia? 
 
The only thing I thought at that time was just leaving Eritrea.  But fortunately, 
because as I told you, Ethiopia is very [similar to Eritrea] meaning that it‘s very 
easy for me.  And I know Ethiopia, because I was born and raised here.  So I 
thought that it would be fine for me. [Interview with KC, June 14, 2008] 
 
Uh, no actually, I‘d prefer Ethiopia, because relatively it is safe here and it is a 
Christian country that we know, and I grow here in Ethiopia and attend my 
classes here, so it‘s not new and strange for me, so it means I can easily adapt.  So 
what I need for me is safe first and I can arrange then to bring my family.  So I 
thought that Ethiopia is the safest… I actually believe that any other land is better 
than Eritrea.  There is no worst place than Eritrea.  So I would prefer to go 
anywhere else because things are better on the outside. While we were in the 
Eritrea, we had a negative opinion about Ethiopia because the two countries are 
enemies.  But when you come to the facts on the ground, there was good facts 
about the hospitality between the refugee and the government, so to see things 
from Eritrean and being in Ethiopia lead to different things.  We had a negative 
attitude before we come here and now we find it‘s good. The only problem we 
have is we don‘t allow to work or find a job in Ethiopia because Ethiopia by itself 
have many unemployment, so we don‘t expect Ethiopia to give us the 
employment opportunity.  Because if it has job it should be for its citizens‘ 
priority.  This is the only problem we have in Ethiopia.  But the hospitality, I 
think I personally appreciate that.  [Interview with NI, May 27, 2008] 
 
I asked all of my interviewees, including the two men quoted above, why they chose 
Ethiopia as their first country of safe haven.  Most of these refugees replied immediately that it 
was the closest international border they could cross and they were in a panic to leave Eritrea.  
This is an incredibly important concern for people facing an imminent threat of persecution; 
many of these people were also stationed in military bases in southern Eritrea and are indeed 
very close to the Eritrean-Ethiopian border.  In addition, when one must walk for eight nights 
through the desert, or pay a smuggler to show him a safe route, distance is an important 
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consideration.  However, I had posited that migration to Ethiopia carried other benefits, and as I 
discussed these with the Eritreans, they began thinking about their choices in new ways.  
However, the choice to cross the border with Ethiopia did not always seem like a choice.  
Sometimes, it was simply a matter of it being the closest border; but for some, it meant being 
reunified with family.  Through our discussions, many of the Eritreans I spent time with began 
thinking about their agency, and acknowledging that they chose to come to Ethiopia, and that 
there were benefits to this choice.  At the time of flight, many of them felt that they were helpless 
and did not think about the benefits the Ethiopian refugee system could afford them (Interviews 
with UB, June 2, 2008, EB, May 28, 2008, and BH, May 26, 2008).   
Of all the refugees I met, only two men had families living legally in Ethiopia before they 
became refugees.  One had been born in Ethiopia, before independence, and was married to an 
Ethiopian woman.  At the start of the border war, he was deported to Eritrea, but his wife, of 
Ethiopian descent, was permitted to stay with her family and their children.  As he was making 
preparations to avoid arbitrary arrest, he clearly chose Ethiopia so that he could be reunited with 
his wife and their children.  Another man had an older son living in Addis Ababa, and he chose 
not only to flee to Ethiopia, but was able to register as an urban refugee because his son was 
working and was able to support him. 
Ethiopia, though, can be a safe place for Eritreans, despite the disadvantages.  Due to the 
state of politics between the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritreans in Ethiopia are 
protected from the PFDJ party and the Eritrean governmental police force.  Unlike other 
neighboring countries, such as Sudan, which allow the PFDJ to operate within their borders and 
police the defected Eritrean populations (Kibreab 1987 and 1996), Ethiopia does not allow the 
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Eritrean government or police entry to the country.  This alleviates the pressures that the PFDJ 
puts on other diasporic populations (Kibreab 1996).  In Sudan, refugees must not only navigate 
the desert and determine migration routes, the smuggler industry and obtaining illegal visas to 
Europe, but they must also avoid PFDJ officers who hide among displaced Eritrean populations.  
These officers occasionally arrest Eritreans who have fled and bring them back to Asmara, for 
detention, torture and even execution (Interview with UG, April 24, 2008).  Ethiopia-residing 
Eritreans, then, are protected from this risk, and it makes Ethiopia a relatively safer space.   
I also suspect that those Eritreans who are called ―amiche,‖ meaning they were born in 
Ethiopia to Eritrean parents, and were deported with their families as the border war began, find 
returning to Ethiopia to be ―returning home.‖
10
  After deportation from Ethiopia to Eritrea, living 
in Asmara, they were called traitors, and treated as though they are not real Eritreans, for their 
constructed identity is that of an enemy outsider.  They are culturally more akin to Ethiopians, 
but among other Eritreans, this makes them seem to not have supported Eritrea during the 
conflicts between the two countries.  Whatever their political leaning, I met mostly amiches who 
were young, urban, college educated young men, who seem to travel together, navigating the 
social field through university, detention, national service and flight as a network of people, 
exchanging stories and advice.   
In Addis Ababa, amiches are more able to blend in than other Eritreans.  They know the 
city, and they speak Amharic with no discernable accent.  They can interact with Ethiopians 
without revealing their identity as outsiders, and in some cases they have been able to reunite 
with family and friends from before they were deported.  However, they all speak of still feeling 
                                                        
10 The label amiche, now an emergent ethnic identity (Hepner 2000), comes from a car company, AMCE, 
Automotive Manufacturing Company of Ethiopia, which imported car parts through Eritrea‘s ports in Massawa or 
Assab, and assembled them in Ethiopia. 
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like outsiders.  Not all of them reveal their ―Eritreanness‖ to acquaintances.  Most of them use 
their ability to appear as though they are from Addis to their advantage, not having to answer 
questions or indicate that they are refugees.  These tactics can be seen in a segment from an 
interview conducted on May 27, 2008: 
LHG: Do you pretend to be Ethiopian while you‘re here? 
 
EB: Every time, every day, everywhere.  Because maybe I am not legal.  Yeah, I 
am sure also, those who are legal, they pretend to do that. 
 
LHG: Do you think that‘s easier for you because you‘re amiche and you grew up 
here so you speak Amharic and you know the city? 
 
EB: Yeah.  Of course, it‘s easier for us.  For those from there, they even just can‘t 
talk.  They just simply silent.  We talk on behalf of them.  [An exchange between 
an amiche and an Ethiopian may go like this:] ―He‘s like that, he can‘t talk, he 
just stay like that.‖  ―Why don‘t he talk?‖  ―He‘s like that.‖ [Interview, May 28, 
2008] 
 
Though they are in a better position than other Eritreans, these amiche men are lost in a 
familiar world.  Unlike most refugees who have left their homes, this group has left a place that 
became their home only after forced deportation, only to return to the place they grew up, yet 
remain just as alienated.  But because they are uniquely able to blend into Ethiopian life in Addis 
Ababa, many of the amiche youth choose to leave Shimelba refugee camp and live under the 
radar in the capital city, becoming urban refugees, both with legal and illegal status.   
Urban Refugees 
In Ethiopia, there are many refugees living in Addis Ababa, who have passed through 
Shimelba yet elected to move away from its semi-protective net of isolation.  Considered urban 
refugees by ARRA and UNHCR, the people who have chosen to leave the camp have done so 
for a variety of reasons.  These urban refugees have the opportunity to obtain legal status if they 
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fit one of three criteria: they have financial support coming from abroad; they have Ethiopian 
family who has agreed to house them in Addis Ababa; or they have been accepted to Addis 
Ababa University and will pursue their studies with permission from the Ethiopian government 
(Interview with Louise Aubin, UNHCR, May 18, 2008).  Despite the opportunity to pursue legal 
urban status, many of the Eritreans I met in Addis Ababa are actually living there illegally.  This 
means that they are registered in Shimelba, but have chosen to leave in order to live a life not 
isolated from the rest of the country, or to escape personal problems faced in the camp.  Because 
these refugees do not have pass permits, and are thus not legally permitted to be outside 
Shimelba, they must live under the radar of the Ethiopian government.  If they are stopped by 
Ethiopian police, they face time in jail and exorbitant fines and bribes before they are sent back 
to the camp.  Some are even forced to sign a statement promising that if they are ever caught 
traveling without a pass permit again, they will voluntarily leave Ethiopia, a coercive tactic that 
absolves Ethiopia of violating the international law of non-refoulement.
11
  In the event of 
terrorist actions in Addis Ababa, these men are usually the first suspects and fear harassment by 
police on a daily basis (Interview with TL, June 2, 2008).  They are unable to work, and as such, 
many of them are not able to afford rent, meals or refreshment.  Because they have chosen to 
leave the camp of their own accord, they are unable to access rations from WFP and as such are 
divested of the support network UNHCR has created for the protection of encamped refugees. 
Most of the urban refugees are amiche, and have been able to appeal to old friends and 
family for support.  They have created networks of other refugees who support and sustain each 
other and share the meager resources they have.  Some of these urban refugees are further able to 
                                                        
11 The international law of non-refoulement prevents refugees from being expelled by countries they have entered as 
a safe-haven and returned to a country where they have a well-founded fear of persecution. 
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draw remittances from abroad, especially if they participate in opposition networks.  The officers 
in these political organizations are usually able to afford houses, and host many other refugees 
for dinner, lively debates and to sleep.  These become almost clubhouses where sometimes more 
than ten refugees discuss issues about the Eritrean government, the meanings of the border war, 
the long-term effects of surviving trauma, and their hopes for resettlement, community, and the 
future of Eritrea (Interview with TL, May 26, 2008).  I was invited to participate in one of these 
discussions, and was the only woman present in a group of nine men.  Unfortunately, the debate 
became heated and pressured enough that they did not continue speaking English after the first 
few exchanges.  As the hours progressed to morning, the room filled more and more with smoke, 
the gas can full of home brewed beer was taken out to be refilled many times, and I retreated to 
the kitchen, where six women worked to clean up from the big dinner party.  We did speak in 
English, mostly of family who had left Eritrea and Ethiopia for locales in the global North, of 
women‘s experiences during forced military service in Eritrea, and of hopes for resettlement.   
Living in Addis also allows these refugees some anonymity from their own community if 
they choose.  They can blend into the Ethiopian community, especially if they are able to speak 
Amharic, and do not have to answer to the rumor mills that operate within the small, captive 
audience that is Shimelba.  With this anonymity comes the desire to further disguise oneself.  
When possible, Eritreans do not speak Tigrinya, favoring the Ethiopian language, Amharic, so 
that strangers may not be able to discern that they are ―foreigners.‖  Most Eritrean refugees do 
not speak openly of Eritrea, Shimelba, or the political problems that cause them to leave.  They 
do use codewords though.  Often, when speaking of Eritrea, they say the ―upper house,‖ and 
when speaking of Isayas Afwerki, the Eritrean President, they use diminutive nicknames.  Often, 
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simple pronouns suffice in conversation: ―there,‖ ―that guy,‖ etc (see Harmon-Gross 2008 for a 
discussion of operationalizing these codewords and how they are inserted into the discourse to 
protect the speakers).  However, I was told by one urban refugee that he prefers living in Addis 
Ababa, because he is able to chew chat (a legal plant stimulant that increases conversation and 
then evokes a period of introspective euphoria) and discuss political issues with Ethiopians 
(Interview with TL, June 2, 2008) but feels has to leave before the introverted stage, for he tries 
to keep his Eritrean identity a secret from Ethiopian acquaintances.   
 Eritreans, especially those who knew one another before undergoing the vast dislocation 
via forced migration, offer each other a support network, sharing money, food, shelter, and 
friendship.  However, these ties are tenuous and small disagreements, political, religious, or 
otherwise can sometimes stretch them to their limits.  However, at all times, the entire refugee 
population in Ethiopia must rely on the infrastructure of support offered by INGOs. 
Encamped Refugees: Living in Shimelba 
 Shimelba is a refugee camp in a precarious place.  The politics of the unresolved border 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea are understood (see Negash and Tronvoll 2000), however, not 
enough precautions have been taken to protect refugees who would be caught in the crossfire if a 
resurgence of fighting were to break out.  Located only 57 kilometers from the contested border, 
and far from a city, or even fertile land and natural resources, Shimelba isolates refugees, and 
puts them in a position of competing with local populations for resources (Interview with Central 
Committee members, June 12, 2008).   
Shimelba was created out of Walanihby Refugee Camp, initially founded in 2001 by 
displaced Kunama people, fleeing persecution and dispossessed of their land by the Eritrean 
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government.  Shimelba itself was recognized as an official refugee camp in 2004, a change in 
status that brought aid from the Ethiopian government, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Refugee 
Committee (IRC).  From this point, it began expanding with an increased migration of Tigrinya 
people fleeing a lifetime of forced military service in Eritrea (Interview with ARRA protection 
officer, May 18, 2008).    
 The founding population was comprised of primarily of Kunama families, and because 
Kunama people are nomadic pastoralists, they arrived on the Ethiopian side of the border in an 
environment that was similar to that which they had left, and were able to bring their goods and 
livestock.  They had in fact arrived among Ethiopian Kunama people and were somewhat able to 
reinstate their social networks.
 12
   At the very least, it should be noted that the Kunama 
community currently in Shimelba is in family units, unlike the Tigrinya population, which is 
primarily comprised of single males, whose median and modal age range is 19-25 years 
(UNHCR 2007d).
13
  This means that though the Kunama are socio-economically disadvantaged 
compared to the other population, they have support networks that the Tigrinya men do not.   
 As the events of September 2001 (including the arrest of the G15, and the detention of 
students in the desert) increased the exodus of youth and those evading military service and 
tightening government control, more people from other ethnic groups began joining the Kunama 
                                                        
12 The division of the Kunama ethnic group by the establishment of the Eritrean border at independence was part of 
the reason the Eritrean government distrusted and mistreated the Kunama north of the border.  They accused the 
Kunama of being Ethiopian sympathizers and traitors to the nation state of Eritrea.  This was compounded largely by 
the fact that Kunama were historically resistant to the EPLF (Killion 1998).  Their land, which had significant 
meaning to them, was confiscated for military use before their flight in 2001 (Naty 2002). 
13 The only data that is available at this time was collected before the end of 2007.  Immediately after my fieldwork 
in Ethiopia concluded, UNHCR conducted a revalidation and collected full demographic data on the Eritrean 




population.  The camp now has residents of all the major ethnic groups represented in the 
Eritrean national identity: the current majority of the camp is Tigrinya, but there is also a 
significant Saho population.  Most of the Afar population who has left Eritrea is in another 
refugee camp in the Afar region of Eritrea (Interview with ARRA protection officer, May 18, 
2008).   
 By 2004 Shimelba camp had been officially recognized by various non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the Ethiopian Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), for 
it had reached more than 4000 residents, who then began undergoing the formal registration 
process.  An official site was procured.  Over the next 4 years, community buildings were 
erected by ARRA and IRC, and many thousands of homes were built by individual refugees.  In 
addition to homes, many other kinds of buildings have been built by refugees using mud bricks, 
which can be made in unlimited quantity from the soil in the area.  There are bars, discos, movie 
theaters, pool halls, and barbershops, clustered in neighborhoods and lining the main drag 
through the camp.  The ―downtown‖ of the refugee camp has proliferated with businesses, and as 
more people arrive, some with remittances coming from relatives, there are more and more 
entrepreneurial enterprises popping up.  One can listen to music coming over speakers (if it can 
be heard over the sound of the generators) get a cold soda, or watch a bootlegged copy of a 
Hollywood movie or a European soccer game. 
 This social environment and the architectural and commercial development make 
Shimelba a camp very different from other refugee camps in Africa.  Most refugee camps are 
comprised mainly of women, children and the elderly.  Because Shimelba is a population of 
people displaced because of forced military service and other forms of political repression, the 
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young male population creates different conditions than in most camps.  According to IRC 
workers who had been employed in many camps and to UNHCR interns working in Addis, 
Shimelba is developed to a degree far above other camps in East Africa.  A simple Google image 
search for photos of refugee camps (www.google.com, accessed September 14, 2008; see 
Figures 1 and 2, below, for results) shows tents made of tarps or small shacks for people to 
inhabit.  Verdirame and Harrell-Bond discuss the layout and social environment of refugee 
camps in Uganda and Kenya, which are also located ―for the most part in inhospitable areas‖ 
(2005: 32).  The camps they discuss seem plagued by pervasive and debilitating poverty, and are 
constantly undermined by UNHCR and governmental policies that inhibit deliverance of human 
rights to refugees.  Despite a few community garden programs, it seems that the camps discussed 
by Verdirame and Harrell-Bond in their book Rights in Exile (2005) do not have the level of 
infrastructure and establishment of business and neighborhoods that Shimelba does.   
As dissent and dissatisfaction spread among Eritreans working in military forced labor in 
Southern Eritrea, the refugee population registering in Shimelba expanded quickly, as the 
Ethiopian military and UNHCR developed intake centers at common crossing points along the 
border and word spread through a very few channels about the new camp and the possible 
resettlement opportunities it afforded to residents.  According to what refugees in Ethiopia told 
me, there were no rumors of life in Shimelba or of resettlement opportunities inside Eritrea.  
Some people knew there was a camp, like Kidane told me: 
LHG: Did you know about Shimelba before you came here?   
 
KC:  Not much.  But I know that a lot of my friends, they were here, and we were 
just contacted through email, then they told me a lot of things about how to live in 





































There is no evidence to support Isayas Afwerki‘s claim that the US, via the CIA, is coercing 
Eritrean youth to flee, promising resettlement to the West ("Hundreds of young have been misled 
that there is heaven outside ... It's an orchestrated attempt to deplete this nation of its young ... 
financed by the CIA" (http://ayyaantuu.com/oromiyaa/NewsBlog/tabid/36/ EntryId/2225/Key-
quotes-from-Eritreas-President-Isaias-Afwerki.aspx, accessed January 20, 2009)). 
 The processes that take place at these intake centers along the contested border seem to 
vary from experience to experience.  What is clear though is that when a refugee has made the 
eight day walk through the desert, traveling mostly at night, so that the Eritrean border guards 
cannot see to shoot him, and is certain that he is well within the territory of Ethiopia, he turns 
himself over to any person he sees.  The population along the border of Ethiopia seems to be 
getting all too used to this.  When a person declares himself an Eritrean citizen, the local 
community readily helps him find an Ethiopian military outpost, where he may begin the initial 
registration process, thereby creating his refugee identity and thrusting himself officially into the 
limbo and powerlessness afforded to refugees within the system.  It is significant to notice that in 
Ethiopia, much as in Kenya and Uganda (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005), refugees have no 
agency or influence in refugee policy in Ethiopia, and lose their voice simultaneously with 
entering the refugee system.  ―Refugees‘ complex, flexible identities and varied, diverse 
experiences translate into needs that require more flexible policies and systems of practices,‖ 
Thieman-Dino and Schechter state (2004: 78), and it becomes more and more crucial to have 
intake procedures that are sensitive to the experiences that precipitated their flight. 
I asked every interviewee to describe his experience crossing the border, looking for 
descriptions of refugees‘ first interaction with the refugee regime and the creation of their 
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positionality as a refugee.  I heard reports that people are jailed at these Ethiopian outposts 
(Interview with KC, June 20, 2008); that Ethiopian military officers attempt rape in exchange for 
registering women as refugees (Interview with TH, June 14, 2008), and that officers use severe 
interrogation proceedings (Interview with GC, June 11, 2008) and detention to deter Eritreans 
from remaining in Ethiopia.  One narrative of this type of negative experience at the border 
illustrates mistrust between nationals of the two countries:  
They were not willing to accept my case, why I‘m coming and they detained me 
for 10 days.  ‗Tell the truth, why you are coming, you are spy, you are lying,‘ they 
said.  I tell them the truth.  ‗No I cannot say anything except for this.  This is the 
only thing I know.‘  And then after 10 days they released me and they sent me to 
the camp.  They have not any choice. [Interview with F, May 28, 2008] 
 
However, most of the people I spoke with told me that the Ethiopian soldiers receive Eritrean 
refugees as brothers and sisters, and treat them well, offering food, water and shelter, until the 
time that the newly arrived refugees can be transported to Enda Baguna for registration with 
UNHCR and WFP.   
There is a proverb in Tigrinya.  But I‘m afraid to translate it.  If someone does to 
you something good, you have to give him the good thing again.  You have to 
respond it in good terms, or else you have to say something about it.  If you do 
something for him, even if he can‘t able to do that thing again to you, he gonna 
say something good about you.  When I come to Ethiopia, the first thing that was 
in my mind is that these people were gonna take me to the Ethiopian government 
and they put me in jail for 6 months, and then I should be screened so wisely and 
nicely, and after they know I‘m not a spy, I was gonna be able to work.  I was 
thinking these things. But I got something other than that.  They were treating me 
so nicely.  They were saying me we were brothers, if not for the time being.  They 
brought to us a warm drink and water to wash ourselves.  And in general, they 
were telling us that they were telling us that this was a short detainment, a short 
war, they were telling me that we were brothers forever and in the future.  This is 
not only my opinion.  I have been here for 6 years, and I‘m asking people from 
Eritrea, and they are telling me the first time you arrive to Ethiopia, the way they 
treat you is so good, so good for everyone.  The first approach when you come 
from Addis or to Eritrea, you get at the borders, you are on display. Everybody is 
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high for Eritreans.  They are happy the first time they come meet you. [Interview 
with BH, May 22, 2008] 
 
The first people we met were the Ethiopian militia.  And there was a good 
hospitality there, the way they treat us and they give us food and shelter and we 
were happy.  So the hospitably was nice, especially the military, they were good 
people and they treat us not as enemy people, but as friendly people and we really 
appreciate that.   The first thing they do usually is that you go to the rest room, 
then to Edna Baguna, which is the registration with UNHCR and ARRA to do 
paperwork things and after we finish that, after a week of time, we go to Shimelba 
refugee camp. [Interview with NI, May 27, 2008] 
 
At the main processing center in Enda Baguna, new Eritrean arrivals are registered prima facie, 
meaning they are automatically recognized as legitimate refugees, and receive ration cards and 
have their names entered into the camp registration database.  It seems that as many as 700-800 
people arrive at these processing centers each month, though no one was able to relay what they 
felt were accurate numbers. 
 People are then brought to Shimelba, where there is no integration program or support for 
new arrivals.  Often it is the case that one is able to find family, friends, or at least acquaintances 
from life in Eritrea; in these cases, people must not survive with only the small arrival package 
given by the UN because they are offered support and care from friends during their adjustment 
phase.  However if they‘re unable to find a friend, they are on their own, having walked out of 
the desert, into a place that may feel deserted despite the thousands of other residents.  They have 
only the blanket, pot, and cup that the UN and WFP have afforded them as their initial rations. 
 More and more people have been arriving in the camp, nearly 7,800 a year in recent years 
(UNHCR 2007d), as word spreads in Eritrea that there is a place to go in Ethiopia where they 
will be protected from the Eritrean government (and nominally protected from the Ethiopian 
government), where food rations are available and resettlement opportunities seem hopeful.  As 
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there has been a mass exodus from Eritrea toward Ethiopia, the population of Shimelba has been 
skyrocketing, with some claims of more than 18,000 people in residence.  According to data 
from UNHCR at the beginning of 2008, these numbers coincide with the number of people 
registered though them, but are unlikely to be accurate to on-the-ground figures (Interview with 
Louise Aubin, UNHCR, May 18, 2008).   
The reason for this disparity between official numbers and the number of people actually 
residing in Shimelba could be that, with increasing population, decreasing services, and seeming 
hopelessness concerning resettlement opportunities, people are leaving Shimelba, to cross the 
desert and enter Sudan, from where there is the potential to cross Libya, board a boat across the 
Mediterranean and enter ―Fortress Europe‖ where they might seek refugee status through asylum 
procedures (Interview with ZA, May 26, 2008, One World 2007).  As stories filter back into the 
camp, utilizing information networks that cross borders and function even without telephone 
lines and Internet connections, tales of success on this path become told and retold.  Yet stories 
of failure and tragedy seem to be more numerous, at least as imparted to me, an outsider.  Many 
people told me that they had a brother, a friend, a classmate who began this journey and has not 
been heard from since.  I was told by ARRA and UNHCR protection officers that nearly 70-80 
people begin on this journey each week (Interviews May 18, May 20, 2008), for risking the walk 
through the desert and the PFDJ presence in Sudan outweighs the idea of staying in Shimelba 
with no hope of resettlement.   
Seventy to eighty people each week is a large number, and does a lot to offset the 700-
800 that register monthly, but does not decrease the population significantly enough to explain 
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the July 2008 numbers of about 10,000 that UNHCR determined through a revalidation.
14
 In 
order to establish an explanation of what else could be occurring we must think about other ways 
refugees are leaving Shimelba.   Illegal travel to Addis Ababa or other cities, where they may 
hope to blend in and find work most likely accounts for a great portion of this migration.  I met 
over 50 Eritrean refugees in Addis Ababa, most of whom were unregistered for urban living.  
Two hundred and one Eritrean refugees are registered as urban refugees with ARRA and 
UNHCR.  In Ethiopia, it is illegal for refugees to travel without a pass permit, as authorized by 
ARRA and Ethiopian government officials, but only for approved circumstances, much as 
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005) outline in other East African countries.  
There are no physical fences surrounding Shimelba, only psychological and 
environmental barriers.  So, should a refugee choose to leave, he must only walk 40 minutes to a 
nearby town, and embark on a 4 day journey by bus to Addis Ababa.  This happens frequently, a 
phenomenon I can attest to, for I met many Eritreans in Addis who were registered in Shimelba 
and in the city illegally, hoping to have a different life, away from the extreme heat and stark 
joblessness that face most in the camp.  A new program does offer legal urban status to anyone 
who can prove he as a family member to support him in Addis, is receiving remittances from 
abroad, or is enrolled in Addis Ababa University.  UNHCR is hoping that this program becomes 
widely used to relieve the crowding and overpopulation in Shimelba Camp. 
If stopped at a checkpoint and unable to provide a valid pass permit and identification, a 
refugee is subject to fines and jail time.  This all amounts to a violation of the human right to 
                                                        
14 In July 2008, UNHCR performed a revalidation, during which time all Eritrean refugees were advised to return to 
Shimelba for a multi-stage process that amounts to a recount and re-registration of the population.  UNHCR 
undertook this revalidation because of the appearance of inflated population statistics.  It was also the method 
through which they were able to determine who was eligible for the group resettlement (Interview with Louise 
Aubin, UNHCR, June 24, 2008). 
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freedom of movement, as guaranteed in UDHR, a document to which Ethiopia is bound by 
international customary law (and which covers all people within its borders, not just citizens).  
Further, regardless of whether they are traveling under valid papers, refugees are prohibited from 
working legally in Ethiopia, another human right taken from refugees in Ethiopia.  This 
therefore, makes them completely dependent on the state and NGOs, and good will of family 
members abroad (via remittances) for survival.   
Support system within the camp 
UNHCR sponsors WFP‘s presence in the camp and each person, regardless of age, is set 
to receive rations each month.  This ration once included teff, the flour used to make injera, the 
bread that is the staple of Eritrean and Ethiopian cuisine.  However, as the drought has affected 
more and more of the Horn of Africa and teff is becoming more expensive or not available at all, 
the WFP has replaced this good with others, including maize and sorghum.  During my visit to 
Shimelba, I attempted to visit the ration tent, but I was told by workers there that I was not 
permitted inside.  When I attempted to take pictures of the structure itself, I was prevented from 
this. Conversations with people leaving the ration distribution center revealed that their monthly 
rations were incomplete.  They had not received even the meager amount that they were granted 
by international aid standards of health and nutrition.  When relaying to me that UNHCR and 
WFP did not supply services to camp residents at Shimelba‘s predecessor, Walanihby, for 52 
straight days in 2003, one man said: 
When someone is administrating something, it is obvious that there can be good 
and bad things, good and bad ways.  As far as someone working, for him to do 
good things at the same time for him to do bad things.  When it comes to UNHCR 
activities regarding Eritreans, all I can say is that they are totally not doing 
well…If these people know that they cannot able to solve refugees here in 
81 
 
Ethiopia, they‘re not supposed to build the camp.  Don‘t make promises not to 
keep them.  Even at the same time, we don‘t have even the basic necessity in the 
camp and in here.  We don‘t even have enough food to eat.  The first basic 
necessity is food, but you don‘t have food even here in Addis or in Shimelba.  To 
give a typical example about what was happening in the camp in the past in the 
camp was in the year 2003 there was an incident for 52 days when the UNHCR 
hasn‘t given anything to the refugees for 52 days. [Interview with BH, May 22, 
2008] 
 
 Among other programs in the camp, IRC offers wellness, education, and social work 
services to all camp citizens.  According to the IRC webpage,  
The IRC Education program provides early childhood development programs, 
primary and secondary education, and adult non-formal education programs to 
children, youth and adults. The community services program provides vocational 
skills training in computer, traditional hand knitting and business development 
/management training. 
[http://tbe.taleo.net/NA2/ats/careers/jobSearch.jsp?org=IRC&cws=1, accessed 
January 20, 2008] 
 
These programs are further offered in cooperation with UNHCR, WFP, and the US Department 
of State‘s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) 
(http://www.theirc.org/where/the_irc_in_ethiopia.html, accessed January 20, 2008).  However, 
the implementation of some of these programs by the IRC staff on site is problematic. IRC, as an 
international organization, employs people from many countries, however, all of the employees 
on site in Shimelba were Ethiopians.  The only exceptions were an American who advised the 
gender based violence program (GBV), who was on a foreign mission during my stay and two 
American university students who had completed social work internships the year before.   
It is the perceived distrust between Eritreans and Ethiopians that makes the delivery of 
aid and social service programs problematic in this environment.  Because I had received 
countless reports that Eritreans did not trust Ethiopians, and because these Eritreans thought that 
the Ethiopians disliked them in turn, I was interested in the repercussions and implications of 
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Ethiopian involvement in programs like social work.  Cycles of mistrust permeate all interactions 
in refugee life, not simply between Eritrean and Ethiopian civilians, or between Eritreans and 
government agents.  Even employees of humanitarian agencies are suspected of being 
―untrustworthy‖ by refugees, and the fact that IRC paid its Ethiopian employees nearly ten times 
as much as it paid its Eritrean volunteers (Fieldnotes, June 10, 2008) only added fuel to the fire 
of mistrust in the camp. 
 It was commonplace to hear people discussing what the programs actually had to offer.  
Indeed, many of the residents I met were hired to work within the IRC programs, as volunteer 
social workers and community educators.  There were paid positions for refugees as teachers in 
the schools for refugees (both formal and non-formal education), in schools created for local 
(non-refugee) populations, as social workers, and as gender based violence counselors.  These 
programs paid the refugees who were allowed to work, and created a bridge between the refugee 
community and the Ethiopian workers, but were not faultless.  The salaries made it possible for 
these refugees to pay for services from other refugees in the camp, created a community of peers, 
gave them daily activities, and valuable work experience.  The individuals who were trained as 
part of these programs had a heightened sense of self, and were less likely to tell me they 
experienced feelings of ―wasted life‖ and hopelessness, but there did exist some resentment from 
those accepted to fill these positions as social workers and educators, and those who were 
rejected.  It seems that a new, higher class of refugees has been created through this process of 
employment at IRC.  They are given bicycles to get around camp quickly, have access to IRC 
resources, such as computers and knowledge of scholarship programs, and have cash to spend on 
food and clothing that other refugees do not necessarily have.   
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 The national IRC employees were hardly more involved in the refugee community than 
the UNCHR workers, who hailed from many countries, but who had absolutely no observable 
contact with the residents of Shimelba.  None of them enters the camp unless they must, and 
even then, are always driven in an IRC vehicle.  As I arrived in Northern Ethiopia, I was escorted 
to the camp by a UNHCR mission of two trucks and eight workers.  For legal reasons and to 
protect their staff from security threats, the UN officers do not reside in the camp.  They are 
based in a Shire, a small city three hours‘ drive from Shimelba.  During missions, they 
occasionally work from Shiraro, one and a half hours from the camp.  They do not stay in the 
camp as the IRC employees do, but instead are driven in and out every day.  While there, they 
remain within the walled UNHCR compound and receive refugees for protection and 
resettlement hours on Tuesdays and Thursdays, much as is done in Addis Ababa.   
 The compounds of the managing organizations, ARRA, IRC, UNHCR and an 
environmental organization, ZOA, are all located on a hill above the main residential area of the 
camp.  Each is surrounded by a fence, and has a guarded gate.  The IRC compound and the 
ARRA compound leave the gates open during the day, but UNHCR‘s gate remains closed and 
there is an intake officer who processes all the visitors on Tuesdays and Thursdays.  People 
begin lining up in the street earlier than 6:30 am, hoping for a protection or resettlement meeting, 
waiting in the hot sun for their pleas to be heard, often with no more than an umbrella to keep 
them comfortable.   This is the case every Tuesday and Thursday morning that the UNHCR 
mission is taking place.  Unfortunately, the missions are short, spanning only a few weeks at a 
time, and not everyone who has need of a protection officer‘s attention can be seen.  This rings 
true in Verdirame and Harrell-Bond‘s work in Kenya and Uganda as well, where fewer than ten 
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refugees are able to see protection officers during a given mission (2005: 88). 
  It is problematic that the UNHCR staff does not make themselves more available to the 
refugees.  I was asked (rhetorically, I assume) many times, how UNHCR can offer protection if 
they are not in the camp at all?  Their presence is so nearly invisible that the UNHCR staff 
members were driven across the street from the UNHCR compound to the IRC compound for a 
meeting.  Every person I asked reported that the UNHCR staff does not enter the main area of 
the camp.  The camp itself has been so ignored that though UNCHR has recently had many 
short-term missions to the camp, that I was the first non-Ethiopian visitor to the camp for years.
15
  
It is true though that the UNCHR officers are pressed for time and overextended on their 
missions due to budgeting and must comply with UN security standards, and so must keep 
missions short and guarded.  I also have compassion as to what their time within the camp must 
be like because of the pressures and expectations exerted by the refugee population.  However, it 
is alarming to think that protection officers are unaware of the conditions in the camp and that 
access to UNHCR is limited for most camp residents.   
 Does this conflict lead refugees to turn to ARRA for their protection issues?  The 
complications of involving ARRA, an organization comprised of Ethiopian government 
employees, in certain protection issues is so distressful to some refugees that many problems go 
unreported.  Despite the resources being poured into the camp, and despite the number of staff 
members all the organizations provide, there seems to be no one for the refugees to turn to with 
confidential information.  I posit that this could be yet another reason for increasing migration 
out of the camp for Sudan and other locales.   
                                                        
15 This information is clearly biased, for I know there were two researchers in Shimelba last year working on issues 
of statelessness.  This type of statement is significant more in that it shows that people living in Shimelba feel like 
the outside world doesn‘t care about their plight.  
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 Interestingly enough, refugees were still unwilling to talk about the hardships they face in 
Shimelba.  Both the women‘s organization and the central committee, as well as numerous 
individuals, told me that they were not interested in discussing their problems, because they had 
previously told everyone who asked yet had seen no results.  This feeling of apathy must be 
borne out of telling many visitors what the hardships involved with living in a refugee camp for 
six plus years, yet seeing none of those visitors affecting change.  It was even difficult to get 
people to talk about such problematic issues as women‘s safety and sexual violence.  For 
example, it was not until I relayed my frustration with local governmental groups such as the 
Women‘s Organization and the Central Committee, that an individual told me of some of the 
problems women face in Shimelba. 
Women who go to collect firewood have to walk very far from the camp, thereby putting 
themselves at risk for attacks and gendered violence, by the local community certainly, and 
possibly by the rest of the refugee population.  Women face this risk as well, while traveling 
three to five kilometers to wash clothing.  Since the IRC has installed a water system in the 
camp, this has become much less of a problem, however, women with only one set of clothing 
still find it necessary to travel far from others to wash their clothing and allow it to dry.  In some 
segments of the population, specifically the Saho ethnic group this has resulted in men 
accompanying their wives on firewood collecting expeditions to keep them safe from predatory 
men.    
Though there is the possibility of re-traumatization involved in telling and retelling past 
experiences and the hardships of life (Ortiz 1997), researchers and institutional employees must 
work to create an environment of trust and security in which people do feel comfortable 
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reporting problems and relaying hardships during meetings.  Refugee camps should not become 
a holding cell where people live indefinitely while they await resettlement, as Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond note is a result of strict encampment policies in Uganda and Kenya (2005: 15) and 
leads to viewing refugee communities as an ―organizational problem‖ to be ―eliminated‖ (2005: 
34-36, 41).  I do not posit that UNHCR Ethiopia views refugees as an organizational problem, 
but it is important to understand that resettlement is only the third choice in durable solutions 
employed by the refugee regime.   
Resettlement: A ―Durable Solution‖? 
UNHCR operates their global refugee assistance programs with an overarching policy 
that there are three ―durable solutions‖ for refugees and displaced people.  These options, in 
order of desirability to UNHCR, are repatriation to country of origin; reintegration to the local 
community in the area of displacement (in the case of Eritreans in Ethiopia, it would likely be 
Northern Ethiopia, near the towns of Shire or Shiraro) (UNHCR 2007b and 2008a); and thirdly, 
resettlement to a receiving country.  Voluntary repatriation is likely to be impossible for many of 
these Eritreans, for upon returning to Eritrea, they believe themselves to be at risk of 
imprisonment, torture, even death (Amnesty International 2008a, Human Rights Watch 2008, US 
State Department 2009). 
Integration within the local community is also problematic for these refugees stranded in 
Shimelba.  Unfortunately, because of limited amounts of resources and long dry spells that 
plague the desert in Northern Ethiopia, the local communities have become distrustful of the new 
settlers.  Some of the conflicts between refugees and local villages include the use of firewood, 
for there is a paucity of trees.  There have been threats passed between the locals and the 
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refugees that for every tree cut down by the refugee population, the locals will ―cut down‖ one 
refugee.   
This tension between the local and refugee communities has resulted in some positive 
programs though.  As the IRC has created educational facilities and health care access for 
encamped refugees, they have also made these programs available to the Ethiopian national 
population.  This is an overt attempt to increase tolerance for Shimelba camp.   
Of the three durable solutions examined in UNHCR‘s global programs, it appears that 
resettlement is the only option for the Eritreans stranded in Ethiopia (UNHCR 2008a).  After 
years of negotiation the Ethiopian government and UNHCR have finally procured ―P2 Group 
Resettlement‖ for approximately 6,500 Shimelba residents. Urban refugees have not been 
included in this group resettlement (Personal correspondence, IRC employee, September 24, 
2008).  Though the residents of the camp were not aware of the group resettlement while I was 
there, they spoke often of resettlement, their hopes for life outside Ethiopia and expectations of 
life in other countries. 
An emerging hierarchy of resettlement countries 
Because resettlement was fresh on the tongues of many refugees I met in Ethiopia, we 
had many discussions about what the resettlement opportunities may look like.  I routinely asked 
people what their preference would be in a resettlement country, if given a choice.  I received 
two answers repeatedly: ―anywhere that is not Eritrea‖ and ―the United States.‖  When pressed, 
refugees would tell me that Canada and Australia were also high on their lists of desirability, as 
were England and Germany, sometimes Sweden and sometimes New Zealand.  No other 
countries were even mentioned.  This could be envisioned as an emerging hierarchy of 
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resettlement locations, wherein certain countries are desired by Eritreans more than others.  
Alternatively, it could be that there are reasons for these preferences.  Rumors and stories of life 
abroad are carried through the information networks that operate between Shimelba and 
diaspora.  Eritreans living in the Europe, the US, and elsewhere certainly tell their contacts in 
Shimelba what the costs and benefits of living in a particular country are.  Alternatively, with 
resettlement opportunities very low before the group resettlement was announced, any country 
that would accept a refugee and allow him a life of freedom is better than Ethiopia.   
The US accepts the majority of refugees worldwide, with a quota of 70,000 refugees per 
year (Martin 2005), and statistics ring true for Eritrea.  Canada and Australia are the only two 
other countries actively accepting refugees from Shimelba (Interview with Louise Aubin, 
UNHCR, May 18, 2008), and since this is the case, many refuges have relatives already living in 
diaspora there.  Family reunification is a priority with resettlement agencies and refugees 
themselves (Martin 2005).  England, Germany, and Sweden also have large Eritrean populations, 
but do not afford the same rights to refugees upon arrival as do the US and Canada (Amnesty 
International 2008b; Royal African Society 2005; Statewatch 2003).  Sweden itself is one of the 
worst human rights offenders of refugees (Amnesty International 2008b), and Germany is having 
reactionary racial problems to great amounts of immigration (personal communication, German 
social worker, January 13, 2008).  European countries are also accessible through illegal routes, 
and become a destination for asylum seekers, many of whom have traveled through the Sudanese 
and Libyan deserts and survived the dangerous trip across the Mediterranean Sea to Malta and 
Italy (BBC 2009). 
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Two final concerns about migration hierarchy are that despite the fact that most Eritreans 
I met in Ethiopia were interested in resettlement to the US, I am American, and there did not 
seem to be a clear preliminary understanding of the influence I may have had on one‘s 
resettlement chances.  I believe that people may have expected me to assist their claims and exert 
influence to speed up the process of resettlement to the US, and therefore told me that it was 
their primary choice.  I also spoke with one very articulate refugee who told me that he did not 
want to be resettled to the US or Europe for two reasons.  Firstly he wanted to stay in Africa 
because he believes in engaged citizenship, and believes his education will enable him to help 
the most people, his people, in Africa. Secondly, he has been fighting to gain freedom from 
Eritrea for most of his life; he therefore does not want to move to the US and become engulfed in 
an Eritrean population, where he hears that the faults of Eritrea will be repeated.  He believes 
that resettlement to the US will result in a life of  threats at the hands of the PFDJ or pressure by 
his neighbors to become involved in opposition fighting: these can be visualized as the ripple 
effects of the second transnationalism, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  Yet, he also 
considers accepting a resettlement opportunity to be giving up; he will not be able to realize a 
free Eritrea from there.  This belies his involvement with opposition groups, and his leadership 
role in the Eritrean community in Ethiopia, which is working for a new government in Eritrea 
(Interview with NA, May 27, 2008). 
This type of involvement in opposition groups is another significant part of the 
experience of living as an Eritrean refugee in Ethiopia, and is the subject of the next chapter.  
Here, I have laid out the major factors of refugeehood and the circumstances that affect the 
community among whom I conducted ethnographic research.  The discussion of life in Addis 
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Ababa and Shimelba, and the services offered to refugees indicates that complicated 
relationships and organizational structure have been developed, but are out of the scope of this 
paper.  Through an examination of trust, agency and decision making, I have illuminated 
resettlement, both as the only available durable solution, and as a pull towards certain countries.  
I have also discussed why Eritreans fled to Ethiopia, even though there are complicated relations 
between the people of both nations.  What follows in Chapter V is a discussion of opposition 
groups, which, by exerting influence on individuals, also have a profound effect on the 
experience of being a refugee. 
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Chapter V: The “Other Transnationalism” and the Politics of 
Refugeehood 
Refugees are an inherently political and transnational problem.  They flee their homes 
because of conflict and political turmoil, they cross international borders, and are protected by 
international law during their path to a durable solution.  The experiences of forced migration, 
registering as a refugee and awaiting a durable solution such as resettlement thrust refugees in to 
the transnational political arena of the ―refugee regime‖ (Malkki 1995; Fullerton 2006).  But 
Eritrean refugees also navigate a second transnationalism, the network of political organizations 
that oppose the Eritrean government.  These groups operate in a transnational social field that 
includes Eritreans in the US, Europe, Australia, the Middle East and other parts of Africa, 
including Ethiopia.  The proliferation of distinct opposition groups in the past five years has 
created an environment of competition among them, but also increases dialogue about human 
rights and the future of Eritrean politics.  These opposition groups have a significant effect on the 
lives of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia because of recruitment and political strategies that 
reverberate through the displaced communities in Addis Ababa and Shimelba. 
Since the early days of the war for independence, the subversive actions of opposition 
and dissident groups have had a substantial effect on the foundations of the Eritrean nation-state 
(Connell 1997; Hepner 2005, 2008, 2009a; Iyob 1995; Negash and Tronvoll 2000).  The Eritrean 
People‘s Liberation front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) created a field within 
which political groups operated to undermine the Ethiopian regime and to create an independent 
Eritrea.  In the years since Eritrean independence, there has been a proliferation of opposition 
groups, which now stand in opposition to the Eritrean government.  Their relations to each other 
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and their actions with respect to one another are incredibly complicated and remain veiled, 
despite the time I dedicated to investigating the subject among refugees.  It seems that the reason 
this confusion persists is because each opposition group, indeed each person involved in the 
opposition, has its/his own agenda and accompanying strategy.  Many of the opposition groups I 
encountered or heard about in Ethiopia are being supported by members in diaspora, much as the 
Eritrean nationalist fronts, the ELF and EPLF, were supported during the war for independence 
by dispersed Eritreans.  In fact, some groups have been formed entirely in diaspora, only some of 
which have sent Eritrean nationals back to Ethiopia to recruit members from the refugee 
population (Conversation with Eritrean-American and organization founder, in Ethiopia for 
recruiting, May 16, 2008).   
A further confounding factor is that most of these opposition groups operate from within 
the shadows.  Though the government illicitly supports some opposition groups, legally, refugees 
in Ethiopia are not permitted to be part of any political group, and most are unaware of the inner 
workings of opposition politics:  
We hear there are some [opposition groups] against the ruling parties, which is 
good.  But I don‘t know exactly their policies or their regulations or something 
like that. But they run.  One thing is clear that they stand against the government.  
And how much they are matured to fight with the ruling party, their potential or 
something like that, I don‘t know.  But one thing I know is that they‘re against the 
ruling party, which I know is good. [Interview with LI, May 27, 2008] 
 
There is no tolerance for foreigners to be involved in this type of organizing or politicking, and 
one can imagine that there would be less tolerance for refugees, who are not permitted the 
opportunity to work.  At this juncture in the political landscape, it could be disastrous for a 
refugee to be discovered to be an active member in a certain opposition group.  Here we see a 
great contradiction: for conflict-displaced refugees are in an inherently political social field, yet 
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are not permitted to have any political agency.  Many of the opposition groups do not simply 
oppose the Eritrean government, they oppose each other, but they offer participants the 
opportunity to articulate their grievances, and to create an image of what they would like to see 
in Eritrean governance.  Despite the fact that few Eritreans speak of human rights, when 
discussing the political nature of opposition politics, they reveal that they learn about agency, 
political involvement and their emergent consciousness as rights bearing citizens through 
participation in organizations with political rhetoric and which present a critique of the 
oppressive Eritrean government.   
In May 2008, just days before my arrival in Addis Ababa, there was a conference of 
opposition groups.  The thirteen major groups all sent representatives to this conference, and they 
set the goal to be developing a ―minimum agreement,‖ defining the standards of participation in 
this social field, and determining the least common denominators of political idealism and goals 
shared by all thirteen opposition groups. It is intriguing that each of these groups can separately 
articulate the goal of unseating Isayas Afwerki and instituting a new government that should be 
democratic, implement the constitution, and stop the dictatorial authoritarian techniques 
developed by PFDJ, but they cannot agree on a unified method of doing so.  In that spirit, they 
formulated the minimum agreement, which counts primarily among its goals the appointment of 
a future leader to take head office in Eritrea until elections can be conducted (Conversation with 
Eritrean-American and organization founder, in Ethiopia for recruiting, May 16, 2008, and 
Interview with NA, May 26, 2008). 
Beyond this though, the groups do not agree on much else.  As a result of the pervasive 
disagreements, it is often the case that these opposition groups are competing with each other.  
94 
 
This intergroup competition could be for members, for funding, for power: all issues that have 
historically caused fragmentation of and infighting within opposition groups.  Anecdotally, it 
seems that each time a single group becomes powerful and begins receiving money from 
supporters in diaspora, there is a conflict of interest between the leaders, causing one group to 
split into two or even three groups.   
This is made even more complicated by the fact that the Ethiopian government, via 
ARRA, supports some (but by no means all) of the Eritrean opposition groups.  Because 
foreigners, and certainly refugees are forbidden to participate in politics inside Ethiopia, ARRA‘s 
support for opposition groups must take place in the shadows.  It becomes even more 
controversial because of these laws for ARRA to support only a few organizations, and this is 
what forces the support to be manifested in covert, illicit manners.  This hidden character likely 
benefits ARRA because they cannot be legally linked to opposition groups that threaten 
individuals.  This support is manifested as the government allowing certain behaviors, through 
financing refugees‘ political work, legal support and permission to engage in politics, and by 
providing pass permits, housing and offices with computers to some refugees.  This support 
likely makes political and strategic sense to ARRA because the Ethiopian and Eritrean 
governments are political enemies, so, a group whose goal would be politically and ideologically 
in line with unseating Isayas Afwerki, would be an ally of Ethiopia.  The overt qualities of the 
support ARRA offers to certain opposition groups is foggy at best, at least to an outside 
researcher.  ARRA does give certain organizations, be they artistic or political, special 
permissions and funding.  This funding has been used for (at least) traveling, publication of a 
semiannual magazine, food and hotel accommodations for members. 
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This support by the Ethiopian government can be detrimental to those not supported.  At 
the very least, it should be considered as a confounding factor to their safety.  Among friends, 
refugees wonder aloud if participating or not participating in certain opposition groups has a 
detrimental effect on their resettlement and protection claims (Field notes, May 20, 2008).  If 
indeed, as articulated by some refugees (see excerpts of interviews included in Chapter III) those 
who refuse to join an opposition group affiliated with ARRA are mistreated by ARRA officers, 
there is a serious protection problem here, and one that should be solved through increased 
protection from UNCHR.  The problems that emerge with ARRA‘s involvement in these 
opposition groups are only confounded by the fact that refugees, especially those in Shimelba, 
are routinely threatened and coerced into joining this type of political organization.  As 
opposition groups are struggling to gain numbers, they have informal recruiting drives, in which 
existing members are reported to use methods such as promising resettlement, threatening 
personal safety, or wielding actual guns (which, of course, are prohibited in the camp but may be 
allowed if ARRA or the police force are allied with this particular opposition group).  Because 
these threats are carried out by individuals with ARRA‘s tacit backing, there seems to be no 
recourse against them.   
Even more troubling, are reports that some opposition groups are ready for a renewed 
effort of armed struggle in Eritrea.  Since Shimelba is so close to the border, if this were the goal 
of an opposition group, it would be a prime recruitment locale.  Further, the residents of 
Shimelba who are not resettled as part of the new group resettlement will be stranded in northern 
Ethiopia.  Some of the possible reasons they have been excluded from resettlement by the US 
government include armed rebellion against a state government.  ―As the terrorism grounds 
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broadened from active and former terrorists to representatives of terrorist organizations to 
members and supporters of terrorist organizations to those who may have endorsed or espoused 
terrorism at one time‖ (Garcia and Wasem 2005) more and more refugees risk fitting the 
definitions of terrorist actors.  The US State Department currently defines these actors as 
terrorists, thereby ineligible for resettlement.  Many refugees in Shimelba do have a history of 
involvement in an armed conflict, and therefore may be considered by some opposition groups to 
be a trained, willing, standing army.  However, every refugee I spoke with told me that he or she 
was opposed to further war, and had fled Eritrea for reasons relating to escaping the fighting that 
has plagued most of their lives.  After emphatically declaring that he does not want to join any 
opposition group, one Shimelba refugee offered this explanation of the problems with opposition 
politics in Ethiopia: 
Generally, the opposition political parties‘ problem is that—first of all, they are 
not united.  One.  I am totally disagree with the way that Eritrean government is 
working, he so [fool] and so I don‘t know what—merciless, and I can say a lot of 
bad things about that government.  But he is so, so strong and strong enough to 
convince the whole people so that he can stay in the position.  You know?  But 
these opposition parties are not united, and their agenda, their agenda is—I don‘t 
like their agenda.  They keep on bothering the refugees, they insist, they insist that 
UNHCR and the ARRA to close this camp, and to make, join by force all the 
young refugees here.  So that they can watch refugees as soldiers to face the 
Eritrean government.  They are so fool, they are so aimless, they are so dis-
integrated, and I don‘t think they will do something for Eritrea.  Their base is not 
strong enough. [Interview with KC, June 14, 2008] 
 
Problematic Involvement of Opposition Parties in Individuals‘ Cases 
As the UNHCR and the US Committee for Refugees (USCR) have been processing the 
group resettlement of Eritrean refugees, it has been rumored that members of certain opposition 
groups have been ―inserting‖ themselves into the process of resettlement for other individuals by 
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suggesting that they have been involved in armed struggle against the government, thereby 
disqualifying them for resettlement within the US system, and leaving them stranded and 
enraged in Shimelba.  This ―insertion‖ may happen during the individual interviews of refugees 
associated with the opposition: they tell their stories and include reports of non-participants in 
opposition groups as fitting within the US‘s definition of terrorists.  It could also happen via 
connections between these opposition groups and ARRA, who have access to confidential case 
files.
16
  Regardless of the method of insertion, what is clear is that the ability of these political 
groups to interfere with resettlement opportunities through wielding information within the 
refugee regime can be detrimental to one‘s resettlement chances. Tricia Hepner and Bettina 
Conrad discovered a similar possible pattern in Germany, where members of opposition parties 
publicly denounced asylum seekers who claimed ―political opinion‖ as a basis for asylum in 
Germany but refused to affiliate with the established opposition organizations (Hepner, personal 
communication).  By capitalizing on the transnational nature of the opposition groups, and 
mobilizing support from the diaspora, these opposition groups are gaining momentum and power 
that enable them to interrupt others‘ opportunities for resettlement.  According to an Eritrean 
political activist in the US interviewed by Tricia Hepner, the intended outcome of this would in 
fact be to force refugees to participate in further armed struggle in the Horn of Africa.  
Moreover, it certainly undermines the efforts of UNHCR to achieve maximum resettlement from 
Shimelba to the US. 
This phenomenon creates ripple effects that move through the Eritrean population in 
Ethiopia, and extend into other diaspora locations.  The tactics used by the opposition groups are 
                                                        
16 See Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005) for other possibilities of what happens to confidential case files in East 
African UNHCR offices. 
98 
 
indicative of the Eritrean transnational environment and the pervasive nature of involvement in 
these networks.  The networks operating in Ethiopia now are set up in much the same ways as 
were the organizations that participated in the war for independence by supporting the EPLF or 
ELF (Hepner 2009a).  The intricacies of relations between the groups, and the bonds and 
breakages between them seem to be vague, and further veiled by political relations between 
individuals who are unwilling to speak openly about their agendas (Interview with NA, May 12, 
2008).  
Therefore, it seems that these opposition groups create another arena through which 
people face discrimination and mistreatment.  Regardless of how opposition organizations are 
manipulated by the Ethiopian government for its own political purposes and how opposition 
groups manipulate refugees for their own ends, the existence of opposition groups is evidence to 
the fact that refugees are beginning to form critical ideologies about the conditions that 
precipitated flight.  With this emerging consciousness, we see that Eritreans in Ethiopia are 
beginning to understand their own experience as refugees in new ways.  Though they don‘t talk 
about their involvement in and interaction with the diasporic community, they are creating and 
joining these opposition groups that employ a rhetoric of political change and strategies for 
delivering rights back to the people.  This could be a precursor to a broader consciousness about 
human rights among refugees.   
 This chapter outlined the second transnationalism, that of Eritrean opposition politics that 
cross from Ethiopia and into diaspora.  The political opposition groups echo those created during 
the thirty-year war for independence and employ the same information sharing tactics as the ELF 
and the EPLF.  I addressed the problems that opposition presence in Ethiopia pose for refugees, 
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especially because they are illicitly supported by ARRA, who violates Ethiopian law in offering 
financial and ideological support.  This becomes problematic when opposition members ―insert‖ 
themselves into resettlement procedures.  It does seem though that opposition politics indicates 
that a critical consciousness exists among Eritreans.  In the next chapter, I will discuss the ways 
in which Eritrean refugees understand human rights, and whether we can consider this an 
emergent human rights consciousness. 
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Chapter VI: Discussion: A Human Rights Consciousness? 
And when I came to Addis Ababa, I read about UNHCR.  When I read it, the 
rights of refugees, really I felt something sad, because we don‘t know those rights 
as a refugee.  You don‘t have many rights put in UNHCR. [Interview with TL, 
June 3, 2008] 
 
 In order to understand the confounding effects of living life within the ―two 
transnationalisms‖ of the refugee regime and the Eritrean transnational political sphere, we must 
examine what it is to be a refugee from the subjective experience of individual people.  By 
exploring the experience of refugeehood, and the involvement of political opposition groups in 
Ethiopia with Eritrean refugee affairs, we begin to understand what the effects of awaiting 
resettlement are for Eritrean refugees.  At the start of this research, I had hypothesized that 
refugees were undergoing a change in subjectivity or consciousness towards that of rights 
bearing citizenship as a result of fleeing political repression and entering into the refugee regime 
in Ethiopia.  This was based on research I had conducted with Dr. Hepner among communities of 
Eritrean asylees in the United States, where a pattern seemed to be emerging that suggested the 
asylum process triggered the development of an explicit rights consciousness. However, analysis 
of the data I collected in communities of urban and encamped refugees in Ethiopia, suggests that 
we might change the questions we asked, and in doing this, we illuminate an interesting facet of 
how people experience the refugee regime.   
Do refugees, whose legal status depends on human rights principles, understand their 
experiences in terms of human rights? Or do they articulate their position mainly with reference 
to the pressures of the refugee regime and contending political opposition groups?  Does the 
experience of being accepted prima facie influence whether and how refugees develop a human 
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rights consciousness?  An understanding of international human rights laws seems crucial to the 
efficient navigation of the refugee regime, and especially the resettlement system, but do 
refugees have this kind of understanding?  At many junctures in the process, refugees are asked 
to narrate their experiences. The way in which they describe the events that precipitated their 
flight, the experiences they‘ve had during this forced migration, and the expectations and 
disappointments they‘ve faced while waiting/wading through the refugee regime may illuminate 
if and how the identities and subjectivities of Eritrean refugees transform during resettlement.   
When asked about human rights, most of the refugees I spoke with were vaguely aware 
of the concept of human rights but could articulate neither the international legal norms of the 
human rights arena, nor could they enumerate a single one of the rights guaranteed under 
international law.  Some individuals were not even aware that there was a body of rights 
guaranteed to every person, regardless of nationality.  One of my participants, an active member 
of an opposition group, had this to say about his knowledge of human rights: 
This is really a nice question.  Uh, I start to open my eyes about the things that 
were going on in Eritrea, while I was in South Africa.  When you are in Eritrea, 
you don‘t know anything much about democracy, human rights, foreign policy, 
good governance or transparency.  Because you don‘t have any media or any 
channel that you can browse or that you can see or read because everything is 
occupied by the government.  There is nothing at all for people to compare.  
There is no mechanism that you can balance the information that you get from the 
government.  Once you get out, you know what is Eritrea, and what is other 
world.  Especially during the past 10 years.  But nowadays, even in Eritrea, things 
are getting good, in a sense, the people are getting aware-ed [sic].  The people are 
very keen to know what‘s going on outside, and even they listen to opposing 
radios they listen to, sorry, watch the opposition television, and at same time, they 
browse websites of the opposition party, and participate in civic societies, so 
nowadays people are even well aware about human rights through these channels. 




 This man‘s ability to engage with human rights concepts began when he was a student in South 
Africa, a nation whose recent history has brought international human rights laws to the forefront 
of public engagement.  Another refugee reported, ―I used to know about human rights and 
related issues from the media, especially 1991-1996, before the border conflicts between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia we were free to enjoy the media from outside.  We used to know, we used to hear, 
and we used to watch things about human rights.  That was the time that I know what human 
rights are‖ (Interview with BH, May 22, 2008).   
 But most of the refugees I met in Ethiopia were unable to articulate even cursory 
knowledge of the human rights system, beyond familiarity with opposition networks. Yet they 
were incredibly receptive to my descriptions of individual human rights.  In the course of 
interviews and discussions, I described mainly civil and political rights, the first generation 
rights, or negative rights, such as freedom from persecution and freedom from torture or  
detention without charge. These are the rights that are routinely violated in Eritrea, and which 
have caused youth to flee in what has become a mass exodus (Amnesty International 2008a, 
Human Rights Watch 2008, US State Department 2009).  They were interested in my 
explanations, and found it illuminating when I told them they had rights simply because they are 
human, and despite Ethiopian laws, are guaranteed protection from persecution because they are 
refugees (Arendt 1951). At this point, they did engage in conversations about human rights 
concepts with me and each other, but mainly as a framework to make sense of their immediate 
experiences with hardship and repression and to articulate their need of humanitarian assistance.  
Still, no one specifically engaged with human rights concepts in abstract terms. 
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The lack of explicit human rights knowledge puts refugees in an incredibly disadvantaged 
position, especially because they rely on international and Ethiopian workers in the refugee 
regime as decision makers and advocates.  If, during interviews, Eritreans are narrating their 
decision to leave Eritrea without referring to human rights violations by name, it is difficult to 
determine what they understand of human rights and how this understanding changes as they 
experience forced migration, refugee encampment and the resettlement process.  Their narrations 
of the conditions that pre-dated their migration are very experiential and immediate in nature.  
Refugees are able to talk about their suffering, their encampment, the ripple effects of having to 
live life under the radar, and at the mercy of the refugee regime and opposition politicking.  
These narratives reveal how the depersonalization of the refugee regime takes a toll on the 
individual, and, more specifically, fails to recognize individuals at all.  As a result of the 
experiences waiting for resettlement, Eritreans who have fled to Ethiopia are undergoing a 
change in consciousness, but I argue that this change in consciousness is not also a change in 
subjectivity; it is a shift toward articulation of experience, and it is subject to the human rights 
arena, and the rights that have been realized by Eritreans now that they are in Ethiopia.  They are 
able to articulate their frustration with the refugee regime in terms like that of the political 
opposition, yet not in a sophisticated manner like that of many asylum seekers who seem to use 
human rights discourse more explicitly (Hepner 2009b). 
I posit that this lack of awareness of the human rights arena is a result of being accepted 
as a refugee prima facie.  Asylum seekers who experience a shift in consciousness and 
demonstrate an awareness of human rights concepts have undergone a rigorous legal process 
which is wholly individualized.  They are saddled with the burden of proof to indicate to a judge 
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that they do fit the definition of a refugee, and have a well-founded fear of persecution 
(Robertson and Camerini 2000), and this process is one that triggers a changed understanding of 
human rights instruments and rights-bearing citizenship.  Successful asylum seekers are required 
produce documents attesting to their past experience of suffering and that indicate that they may 
undergo this persecution if forcibly returned to Eritrea. They also often interact with attorneys 
and other advocates, including human rights organizations, which inform them of their rights and 
encourage them to frame their experience in the language of rights violations (Hepner 2009b).  
However, Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia who are accepted prima facie are not asked to 
bear the burden of proof, nor do they need to explain their individual experiences.  They simply 
reveal themselves to Ethiopian officials, and claim to be Eritrean.  Due to the policy of prima 
facie acceptance, they are lumped into a group of faceless need.  They are pushed through the 
refugee regime as one of many, a depersonalizing and disorienting experience that will lead them 
to be fraught with disappointment. 
 I suggest that it is precisely the prima facie policy in Ethiopia that leads to this 
depersonalization, and the inability to understand the human rights arena which refugees are so 
dependent upon.  Inability to discuss human rights norms is pervasive among the Ethiopian 
population of Eritreans: one Eritrean in Shimelba, an artist and poet, was able to use advanced 
concepts in his poetry, despite not speaking English very well.  He, like other refugees, 
understood that they had ―humanity‖ but was not aware that being human granted them rights 
under international law: 
LHG: Do you know about human rights? 
 




LHG:  But do you know about the laws protecting your human rights? 
 
BB: Not exactly, yes, I know subconsciously, most of the human rights things I 
know subconsciously.  I know the human dignity.   
 
LHG: like you were telling me yesterday about humanity. 
 
BB: Yes, so if someone is living properly, what is the need of him, so this is 
mmmm, awareness, workmanship, intellectual. To do all this, uh, you will have 
presence of mind.  So, this is the main thing every individual could have to 
collect.  If some gave you to collect this chance, there is humanity.  If it is out of 
this, it is not humanity.  So, I can read there by these things what humanity means 
to me and for us. [Interview with BB, June 11, 2008] 
 
This explanation is valuable in that it gives us a local model to describe the elements of chance 
and humanity, but it does not really indicate an understanding of human rights, or of resettlement 
opportunities as afforded by UNHCR and foreign governments.   
Agency and Experience 
The patterns of events that precipitate the decision to leave Eritrea are repeated instances 
of human rights abuses, and there is a genuine and pervasive fear of persecution that 
characterizes the Eritrean condition, especially that of the youth involved in a lifetime of military 
and national service.  Yet, the victims and survivors of these events do not know that they are 
protected by many statues of international law.  They leave Eritrea because they experienced an 
event: imprisonment, or the threat of death or torture.  And since, within their country‘s borders, 
they did not know that they were protected from these specific experiences and the legacies they 
have left behind, they are unable to articulate their claims for resettlement in terms of human 
rights.  If they had been, their claims for resettlement would be received on a more 
individualized basis.   Though UNHCR workers understand the underlying human rights abuses 
that have become patterns of violence in Eritrea, these patterns, and  their illegality, are not 
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communicated back to Eritrean refugees, who end up feeling as though the UNHCR does not, 
and does not care to, understand the history of abuse that they have faced in Eritrea.  This leads 
Eritrean refugees to dwell on the immediacy of their experience, and not to develop abstract 
understandings of the refugee regime or the human rights arena. 
 In practice, most of the Eritrean refugees I met with told me that they are looking for a 
better life, one in which they are able to support their families and have certain freedoms.  Is this 
financial freedom?  Freedom to work for whomever they want?  Freedom from a lifetime of 
national service and oppressive politics?  Any of the other freedoms written into the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as first and second generation human rights?  However, they must 
take caution during their interviews with USCR and JVA: if their statements about a better life 
are interpreted in a certain way, these people fall out of the net that supports conflict-displaced 
persons and they become economic migrants.  They are therefore ineligible for resettlement as a 
refugee, but must enter an entirely different migration system – one in which not every migrant 
is granted citizenship or the right to work in their country.  Refugees walk a fine line, one that 
relies on the definition of political refugees as those who have experienced persecution, who 
have crossed an international border to escape that mistreatment, and who still face a well-
founded fear of persecution in their country (Fullerton 2006; Malkki 1995; Mahmood 1996).  If, 
during their interviews, individuals discuss only their concern with ―a better life‖ and are not 
willing to reveal the instances when they have suffered at the hands of the Eritrean state, they 
compound their risk of not being resettled.    
 The perilous repercussions of each interview are great.  Besides being classified outside 
the definition of a refugee, there is the risk of revealing inconsistencies during the multi-staged 
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interview process, and of self-identifying as a participant in an anti-state movement (e.g., as one 
who fits the US definition of a terrorist).  In one‘s initial interviews, certain elements of the 
migration narrative may be eliminated, dismissed as unimportant.  If these elements are later 
determined by information network participants to be important, they may be reemphasized.  The 
reverse process is equally possible.  As thematizing occurs, if certain events are included to 
strike a point – a certain manner of persecution that is (more) likely to engender success, 
personal narratives become less personal, just as the process of prima facie acceptance treats 
Eritrean refugees less and less as individuals.   
 Because of the standards of acceptance as refugees in Ethiopia, Eritreans are lumped 
together, and thrust through the depersonalized system.  This seems to have resulted in 
diminished human rights consciousness among refugees as compared to asylum seekers, who 
have arrived in the US on their own accord and achieve legal recognition as refugees through a 
much more individualized process.  Refugees‘ consciousness in Ethiopia is based on raw 
experience with repression, the refugee regime, dehumanizing bureaucracy, Ethiopian mistrust, 
and entanglement with political opposition – not awareness of human rights. 
 During conversations with refugees, I began explaining what international human rights 
law meant to my research, and as such, how I thought it applied to their cases.  In the context of 
these discussions, I would ask refugees to tell me again about the human rights abuses they had 
suffered.  Repeatedly, I heard stories that had the same elements: prolonged military service, 
arbitrary arrest, detention in shipping containers.  This indicates that there is, indeed, a patterning 
of violence originating with the Eritrean state and extra-judicial practices sanctioned by the 
single governmental party.  However, even with thematizing of narratives, there does not seem to 
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be a broad understanding of the subject matters these narratives reveal to the interviewer.  
Refugees in Shimelba and Addis Ababa seem wholly unaware of human rights concepts, and the 
applications of these concepts to their personal cases. 
 I propose that without a thorough understanding of the system, cognizant navigation of its 
caveats is nearly impossible.  This compounds the powerlessness of refugees who have been 
thrust into the complicated network of the two transnationalisms, and struggle to find advocates 
and representatives within the UNHCR machine.  Their subjectivities, while undergoing changes 
persuant to displacement, prolonged residence in refugee camps, and as survivors of human 
rights abuses, do not change because of increasing awareness of human rights instruments.  
Because of prima facie acceptance of Eritreans at the Ethiopian border, they are not encouraged 
to learn the language of human rights, and are divested of the individualization that may create 
human rights consciousness in asylum seekers.  Human rights discourse is absent from the public 
sphere in Eritrea (Interview with LI, May 27, 2008) and with the excision of all NGOs from 
Eritrea (ibid), there is no forum from which Eritreans can learn about human rights until they flee 
their borders.   
 While Hepner (2008, 2009a, b) has noted an increase in human rights consciousness and 
participation in the sphere of activism among Eritrean asylum seekers in the US, there seems to 
be no such movement among Eritreans in Ethiopia.  This is interesting, especially considering 
the access to the diasporic Eritrean community and its large numbers in Ethiopia, and the 
proliferation of opposition parties that operate from Addis Ababa and Shimelba.  It seems as 
though it is the differential experiences of proving one‘s asylum case, and being lumped, prima 
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facie, with thousands of other refugees that is the spark that begins the shift in subjectivity 
towards that of a rights bearing citizen, with a consciousness of human rights norms.   
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
 Anthropology has only recently begun examining the refugee regime and the effect of 
dislocation on refugees.  Despite efforts to create a unified theory of displacement (Oliver-Smith 
and Button 2009), conflict-displaced refugees undergo unique phenomena, including the 
experience of political violence, such as torture, rape, and detention; conflict displacement 
therefore still warrants more investigation.  Through this examination of Eritrean refugees, I 
have begun exploring the ways in which refugees understand the human rights arena and the 
transnational network through which they must navigate in order to be resettled to the West. 
Throughout this thesis I have outlined the face of the refugee regime in Ethiopia, where 
refugees interact with the Ethiopian Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), though they do not understand the 
inner workings of the system that has registered them as refugees, and which they depend upon 
for protection and a durable solution. 
I have also explored the experience of refugeehood in Ethiopia, and looked at the 
complexities of being a refugee in an enemy nation.  Through an illumination of the secrecy and 
trust that Eritreans in Ethiopia must employ as a matter of survival, I have been able to describe 
what life is like for refugees in urban and encamped situations.  Legal and illegal urban refugees 
live in a world where they must conceal their identities and use codewords because they feel that 
they must not let Ethiopians know that they are Eritrean.  Refugees living in Shimelba are only 
57 kilometers from the contested border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, thereby living at risk if 
there were a re-ignition of the border war.  They are isolated from friends, and family.  Like all 
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refugees in Ethiopia, they are divested of their human rights to freedom of movement and 
freedom to find gainful employment. 
Due to the transnational nature of the Eritrean diaspora, and the social trends begun with 
the establishment of political opposition networks during the thirty-year war for independence, 
Eritreans must navigate a transnational social field in addition to the transnational refugee 
regime.  The proliferation of opposition groups operating in Ethiopia, but receiving remittances 
and political support from the larger diaspora, use tactics similar to those developed during the 
struggle for independence.  Many refugees refuse to join these political organizations, in keeping 
with Ethiopian laws that forbid refugee involvement in politics.  The laws that make it illegal for 
refugees to engage in politicking do not prevent ARRA from supporting some of the opposition 
networks, creating a dynamic which results in the use of threats and coercion to gain new 
members; some groups are able to increase pressure on non-members because they receive 
clandestine support from the Ethiopian government, via ARRA.  This support is manifested in 
the form of money and special privileges, among other things. 
As refugees navigate this second transnationalism they have very little access to UNHCR 
protection services, even when they feel that they have special cases.  In fact, there are rumors of 
opposition members ―inserting‖ themselves and the narrative of the opposition groups into the 
resettlement interviews of uninvolved individuals.  If this raises suspicion that an individual has 
been involved in anti-state military activities (as would past involvement in the Eritrean 
Liberation Front would), chances of resettlement to the US are greatly reduced because of post 
September 11
th
 security measures.  UNHCR, working in Ethiopia to find durable solutions for 
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200,000 refugees, has secured a group resettlement for approximately 6,500 Eritreans registered 
in Shimelba, yet news of the resettlement was kept from refugees until processing had begun.   
During the past seven years of mass exodus from Eritrea, refugees have begun sharing 
stories of persecution in Eritrea.  As these stories are passed through information networks that 
permeate Ethiopia and abroad, themes are created and carried through stories of human rights 
violations, escape and encampment. As government and INGO workers become aware of 
thematizing, it seems that they begin mistrusting refugees.  I posit that this process also leads 
them to become less able to see refugees as individuals, with individual claims and individual 
experiences, much as Verdirame and Harrell-Bond do in the institutions they analyzed (2005).  
The depersonalization that refugees experience in Ethiopian system likely results from 
the fact that refugee status determination in Ethiopia, which is left up to UNHCR in other 
countries, is circumvented here, for all refugees are accepted prima facie, without having to 
prove nationality or a well-founded fear of persecution in order to be registered for rations and 
resettlement to a third country.  I argue that it is precisely the fact that refugees are accepted 
prima facie that leads to a diminished understanding of human rights.  I had theorized that, like 
Eritrean asylum seekers who have arrived in the US, refugees would begin understanding human 
rights in such a way that they experience a change in subjectivity to that of rights-bearing 
citizenship.  However, these asylum seekers bear the burden of proof of their history of 
persecution, and must navigate the immigration system, through which they acquire knowledge 
of international human rights concepts and norms.  Refugees who are accepted prima facie do 
not have much understanding of human rights laws, and some refugees were not even aware of 
the fact that they are guaranteed certain rights simply by being human.  Though they must be 
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familiar with the bureaucratic political system for processing refugees in Ethiopia, they do not 
encounter human rights law or learn how to use its language to their advantage.  Without 
developing an abstract idea of human rights, their subjectivities remain captured in their 
experiences of frustration, repression and dehumanization.  Their willingness to offer narrations 
of the events that precipitate their flight, crossing the border on foot in the dark, and languishing 
in Shimelba all reveal the experiential nature of refugeehood. 
We must ask then, would prior understanding of the human rights arena change a 
refugee‘s experience?  Would it help him to expedite his claim and to achieve resettlement 
sooner?  Would it make the process smoother, if not faster?  And whose responsibility is it to 
provide them with education about human rights laws?  Is UNHCR, as the protector of human 
rights, responsible for educating displaced populations about these rights, or does that violate 
UNHCR‘s humanitarian mandate?  Does the responsibility then fall to the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), an NGO offering education and social work programs in the camp?  Are there 
ways of encouraging refugees to engage in human rights law even if they are accepted prima 
facie?   
 Or, must we wonder, if human rights education would achieve the means of the refugee 
regime (the discouragement of migration) and do INGOs deal with refugees by stymieing their 
claims?  Does not knowing human rights discourse or principles keep refugees disempowered? 
Does this make them pawns for power holders, like Ethiopia and like the opposition groups? 
Will an increased consciousness of human rights among refugees make them even more 
miserable, highlighting how the refugee regime falls short of truly protecting these?   
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Future avenues of research should seek answers to all of these questions by examining 
refugees‘ and asylees‘ familiarity with human rights concepts at different stages of the migration 
and resettlement process.  Eritrea‘s history and transnational character are very much factors 
influencing these processes, so it would be useful to see if we can isolate the circumstances 
which precipitate a shift in consciousness by conducting fieldwork among refugees of other 
nationalities.  Further and more in-depth examination of the legal pluralism that encompasses 
this and other elements of the refugee regime, and how local politics, individual governments‘ 
policies and international law interface to determine refugees‘ future would be useful to a 
comprehensive study of the international refugee regime and its effect on refugee communities 
before and after resettlement.  By answering the questions posed above, we may determine at 
what stage in the process of dislocation to introduce human rights concepts to refugees so that 
they can maximize their interactions with the refugee regime.  Further, by illuminating what they 
do not understand about the transnational refugee regime, we can begin repairing the faults in 
refugee protection. 
Much as we need to expand the study of human rights consciousness and the ways 
displaced people understand the refugee regime through which they must navigate, comparative 
analysis and policy oriented research are not the only options for further study.  The need for 
longitudinal studies is immense, and we would be remiss if we let the opportunity to continue 
studying the effects of resettlement on Shimelba residents pass.  As UNHCR and the US 
government and affiliated NGOs resettle and integrate Eritreans from the group resettlement, it 
will be possible to conduct further research with many of these individuals as they finally seek 
out further education, start families and appreciate a life safe from the oppressive Eritrean 
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government (but not necessarily the second transnational field: Eritrean PFDJ officers who 
operate in the US, policing the diasporic community and exacting the 2% tax from Eritrean-
Americans).  It may even be possible to better understand the front end of the resettlement and 
the ways newly resettled refugees interface with the transnational Eritrean diaspora and confront 
American culture in US urban centers.  Over time, we may see voluntary migration patterns 
within the US; though the organizations in the refugee regime place refugees in communities, 
either with many or with very few nationals of their former countries, refugees are free to move, 
and may begin migrating towards cities like Chicago, Washington DC and New York, where 
there are already large Eritrean populations.   
Through an in-depth, long term examination of how the effects of group resettlement 
ripple through the Eritrean diasporic community, we will certainly gain insight into the benefits 
of and the problems with resettlement as a durable solution.  Further, we may also understand 
more of the experience of refugeehood, as revealed through patterns in narratives, and the ways 
in which policies of the refugee regime, be they ARRA‘s policy of supporting opposition groups, 
or UNHCR‘s policy of registering refugees prima facie, affect the subjectivities and 



















Al-Ali, Nadje, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser. 2001a. The limits to ‗transnationalism‘: 
Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in Europe as emerging transnational communities. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 24: 578-600. 
Afflitto, Frank M. 2000. The Homogenizing Effects of State-Sponsored Terrorism: The Case of 
Guatemala.  In Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror. Jeffrey Sluka, ed. Pp. 
114-126. Philadelphia: Penn Press. 
Amnesty International. 2005. Eritrea: ‗You have no right to ask‘-Government resists 
Scrutiny/Non-Human Rights. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR64/003/2004, 
accessed April 15, 2009. 
_____. 2007. Free Eritrean Journalists.  Electronic document, 
http://www.freeeritreanjournalists.org/background.html, accessed March 31, 2008. 
_____. 2008a. Eritrean asylum-seekers face deportation from Egypt. http://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/news-and-updates/news/eritrean-asylum-seekers-face-deportation-egypt-20081219, 
accessed Feb 20, 2008. 
_____. 2008b. Amnesty International Report 2008: Sweden. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,AMNESTY,,SWE,483e27b341,0.html, 
accessed March 28, 2009. 




Baillet, Cecilla M. 2007. Examining Sexual Violence in the Military Within the Context of 
Eritrean Asylum Claims Presented in Norway. International Journal of Refugee Law 
19(3): 471-510. 
BBC. 2009. Plea for Reforms After Migrant Tragedy. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
7975607.stm, accessed March 31, 2009. 
Bernal, Victoria. 2005. Eritrea on-line: Diaspora, cyberspace, and the public sphere. American 
Ethnologist 32(4): 660-675. 
Black, Richard. 2001. Fifty Years of Refugee Studies: From Theory to Policy. Special Issue, 
―UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance,‖ International Migration 
Review 35(1): 57-78. 
Caruth, Cathy. 1996. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Cobb, Charles Jr. 2001. Eritrea: Party Puts is Case Against Dissidents. All Africa, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200109260023.html, accessed September 30, 2008.  
Connell, Dan. 1997. Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution. Lawrenceville: 
The Red Sea Press. 
Crisp, Jeff. 2008. Beyond the Nexus: UNHCR‘s evolving perspective on refugee protection and 




Deen, Thalif. 2008. UN Peacekeeping in Eritrea Grinds to a Halt. All Africa, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200802070058.html, accessed March 31, 2008. 
Donham, Donald L. 1999. History, Power, Ideology: Central Issues in Marxism and 
Anthropology. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Farmer, Paul. 2004. Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights and the New War on the Poor. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Fithen, Casper and Paul Richards. 2005 Making War, Crafting Peace: Militia Solidarities and 
Demobilization in Sierra Leone. In No Peace No War: An Anthropology of 
Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Paul Richards, ed. Pp. 117-136. Oxford: James Currey 
Press. 
Frelick, Bill. 2005. US Detention of Asylum Seekers and Human Rights. Washington DC: 
Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display. 
cfm?ID=296, accessed January 15, 2009. 
Fullerton, Maryellen. 2006. The International and National Protection of Refugees. In Human 
Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action. Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. 
Weston, eds. Pp. 136-144. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Gallagher, Dennis. 1989. The Evolution of the International Refugee System. Special Silver 
Anniversary Issue, ―International Migration an Assessment for the 90‘s,‖ International 
Migration Review 23(3): 579-598. 
Garcia, Michael John and Ruth Ellen Wasem. 2005. Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for 
Exclusion of Aliens. CRS Report for Congress. http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/ 
news/2005,1027-terrorist.pdf, accessed February 28, 2008. 
Gibney, Matthew J. 2004. The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the 
Response to Refugees. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Glick-Schiller, Nina and Georges Fouroun. 2001. Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long-Distance 
Nationalism and the Search for Home. Durham: Duke University Press.   
Green, Linda. 2004. Living in a State of Fear. In Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology. 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, eds. Pp. 186-195. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Harmon-Gross, Lily 2008. The Changing Subjectivities of Eritrean Asylum Seekers. 
Anthropology News 49(5): 15-16. 
Hepner, Tricia R. 2000. ―Pride, Prejudice, and Ethnicization of the Eritrean Nation.‖ Ufahamu: 
Journal of the African Activist Association 28: 87-103. 
_____. 2003. Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society in the Eritrean Diaspora. 
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 10(3):269-293. 
_____. 2005. Transnational Tegadelti: Eritreans for Liberation and the Eritrean People‘s 
Liberation Front. Special Edition, ―Eritrea Abroad: Critical Reflections on the Global 
Diaspora,‖ Eritrean Studies Review Special Edition 4:2. 
119 
 
_____. 2008. Transnational Governance and the Centralization of State Power in Eritrea and 
Exile. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31(3): 476-502.  
_____. 2008b. Between Persecution and Policy: New Eritrean Refugees and Human Rights. 
Paper Presented at the University of Tennessee Humanities Lecture Series. September 17, 
2008. 
_____. 2009a. Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the 
Diaspora. Ethnography of Political Violence Series. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
_____. 2009b. Seeking Asylum in a Transnational Social Field: New Refugees and Struggles for 
Autonomy and Human Rights. In Biopolitics, Militarism, and Development: Eritrea in 
the 21st Century. David O‘Kane and Tricia R. Hepner, eds. Dislocations Series. New 
York: Berghahn Books. pp. 183-206. 
Hepner, Tricia Redeker and Bettina Conrad, eds. 2005. Eritrea Abroad: Critical Reflections on 
the Global Diaspora. Special Edition, ―Eritrea Abroad: Critical Reflections on the Global 
Diaspora,‖ Eritrean Studies Review 4: 2. 
Human Rights Watch. 2008, World Report: Eritrea. http://www.hrw.org/en/worldreport/ 
2009/eritrea?print, accessed March 23, 2008. 
Hynes, Tricia. 2003. The issue of ‗trust‘ or ‗mistrust‘ in research with refugees: choices, caveats 
and considerations for researchers. Research Paper No. 98: New Issues in Refugee 
Research. Geneva: UNHCR. 
Inhetveen, Katharina. 2006. ―Because We Are Refugees‖: Utilizing a Legal Label. Research 
Paper No. 130: New Issues in Refugee Research. Geneva: UNHCR. 
Iyob, Ruth. 1995. The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 
1941-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jacobsen, Karen. 2002. Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African 
Statebuilding. The Journal of Modern African Studies 40(4): 577-596. 
Jacobsen, Karen and Loren B. Landau. 2003. The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some 
Methodological and Ethical Considerations in Social Science Research on Forced 
Migration. Disasters 27(3): 185-206. 
Kibreab, Gaim. 1985. African Refugees: Reflections on the African Refugee Problem. Trenton: 
Africa World Press. 
_____. 1987. Refugees and Development in Africa: The Case of Eritrea. Trenton: The Red Sea 
Press. 
_____. 1996. Eritrean and Ethiopian Refugees in Khartoum: What the eyes refuse to see. African 
Studies Review 39(3): 131-178. 
_____. 2005. Yearning for Home or the Diaspora? New Urban Refugees in Sudan. Special 
Edition, ―Eritrea Abroad: Critical Reflections on the Global Diaspora,‖ Eritrean Studies 
Review 4: 2. 
120 
 
Killion, Tom. 1998. Historical Dictionary of Eritrea. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. 
Loescher, Gil. 1992. Refugee Movements and International Security. Adelphi Paper 268, Int. 
Inst. Strat. Stud. London: Brassey‘s. 
_____. 2001. The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy. 
Special Issue, ―UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance,‖ 
International Migration Review 35(1): 33-56. 
Mahmood, Cynthia K. 1996. Asylum, Violence and the Limits of Advocacy. Human 
Organization 55(4): 493-498. 
_____. 2000. Trials by Fire: Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir. In Death Squad: The 
anthropology of State Terror. Jeffrey Sluka, ed. Pp. 71-90. Philadelphia: Penn Press. 
Malkki, Liisa H. 1995. Refugees and Exile: From ―Refugee Studies‖ to the National Order of 
Things. Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 495-523. 
Markakis, John. 1987. National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Martin, David. 2005. The United States Refugee Admission Program: Reforms for a New Era of 
Refugee Resettlement. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 
Muller, Tanja R. 2009. Human Resource Development and the State: Higher Education in 
Postrevolutionary Eritrea. In Biopolitics, Militarism and Development. David O‘Kane ad 
Tricia R. Hepner, eds. Pp. 53-71. London: Berghahn Books. 
Nagengast, Carole. 1994. Violence, Terror, and the Crisis of the State. Annual Review of 
Anthropology 23: 109-136. 
Naty, Alexander. 2002. Potential conflicts in the former Gash-Setit region, Western Eritrea: 
threats to peace and security. Organization for Social Science: Research in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. www.geocities.com/~dagmawi/Zebenya/01/Kunama_Conflicts_ 
Alexander_Naty.pdf, accessed March 28, 2009. 
Negash, Tekeste. 1997. Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience. Edison, NJ: Transaction 
Press. 
Negash, Tekeste and Kjetil Tronvoll. 2000. Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-
Ethiopian War. Oxford and Athens, OH: James Currey; Ohio University Press.  
Nobel, Peter. 1988. Refugees and Other Migrants Viewed with a Legal Eye – or How to Fight 
Confusion. In Displaced Persons. Kirsten H. Petersen and Anna Rutherford, eds. Pp. 18-
31. Sydney: Dangaroo Press. 
Nordstrom, Carolyn. 1997. A Different Kind of War Story. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
_____. 2004. Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-
first Century. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
121 
 
O‘Kane, David and Tricia R. Hepner, eds. 2009. Biopolitics, Militarism and Development. 
London: Berghahn Books. 
Oliver-Smith, Anthony and Gregory Button. 2009. Out of Place: Population Displacement by 
Disasters, Development and Conflict: Towards a Unified Theory of Involuntary 
Migration and Resettlement. Panel Presented at Society for Applied Anthropology, Santa 
Fe. 
One World. 2007. Help Vessels in Distress, Refugee Agency Tells Europe. 
http://us.oneworld.net/places/eritrea/-/article/help-vessels-distress-refugee-agency-tells-
europe, accessed March 31, 2009. 
Ortiz, Sister Dianna. 1997. The Survivors‘ Perspective: Voices from the Center. In The Mental 
Health Consequences of Torture. E. Gerrity, T. Keane, and F. Tuma, eds. Pp. 13-34. 
Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. New York, 2001. 
Pool, David. 2001. From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front. 
Oxford and Athens, OH: James Currey; Ohio University Press. 
Richards, Paul. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. 
London: James Currey Publishers. 
Riggan, Jennifer. 2009. Avoiding Wastage by Making Soldiers: Technologies of the State and 
the Imagination of the Educated Nation. In Biopolitics, Militarism and Development. 
David O‘Kane ad Tricia R. Hepner, eds. Pp. 72-91. London: Berghahn Books. 
Robertson, Shari and Michael Camerini. 2000. Well Founded Fear. 119 min. POV Pictures: 
Washington DC. 
Royal African Society. 2005. Refugees and African Development: the case of Eritreans in the 
UK. http://www.royalafricansociety.org/index.php?Itemid=240&id=241&option= 
com_content&task=view, accessed March 31, 2008. 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy.1995. The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant 
Anthropology. Current Anthropology 36(3):409-420. 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy and Philippe Bourgois, eds. 2004. Violence in War and Peace: An 
Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Sluka, Jeffrey A., ed. Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
Speed, Shannon. 2006. At the Crossroads of Human Rights and Anthropology: Toward a 
Critically Engaged Activist Research. American Anthropologist 108(1): 66-76. 
Statewatch. 2003. Germany's refugee politics and its deadly consequences: 1993 to 2003.  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/feb/32germany-refugees-
deathsand%20injuries.htm, accessed March 31, 2009. 
Thieman-Dino, Angela and James A. Schechter. 2004. Refugee Voices: The Missing Piece in 
Refugee Policies and Practices. In Human Rights: The Scholar as Activist. Carole 




Tronvoll, Kjetil. 1998. Mai Weini: A Highland Village in Eritrea: A Study of the  People, Their 
Livelihood, and Land Tenure During Times of Turbulence. Trenton: The Red Sea Press.  
Turner, Victor. 1969 (1995). The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure.  New Jersey: 
Aldine Transaction. 
UNHCR. 2007a. Ethiopia: Implementing the 10-point Plan of Action.  Geneva: UNHCR. 
_____. 2007b. 2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced 
and Stateless Persons. Geneva: UNHCR. 
_____. 2007c. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva: UNHCR.  
_____. 2007d. Data on Eritrean Refugees in Shimelba. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: UNHCR. 
_____. 2008a. Country Operations Plan 2008: Ethiopia. Geneva: UNHCR. 
_____. 2008b. UNHCR Ethiopia National Program Fact Sheet, April 2008. Geneva: UNHCR. 
_____. 2009. Eritrea: Information on the Kunama Ethnic Group. http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/country,,USCIS,,ERI,,3f520a484,0.html, accessed March 17, 2009. 
US State Department. 2008. 2008 Human Rights Report: Eritrea. http://www.state.gov/g/ 
drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119000.htm, accessed Feb 26, 2009. 
Verdirame, Guglielmo and Barbara Harrell-Bond. 2005. Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced 
Humanitarianism. Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Wallenchinsky, David. 2009. The World‘s 10 Worst Dictators http://www.parade.com/ 
dictators/2009/the-worlds-10-worst-dictators.html?index=8, accessed March 31, 2009. 
Woldemikael, Tekle M. 1993. The Cultural Construction of Eritrean Nationalist Movements. In 
The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? C. Young, ed. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press.  
______. 2005. Bridging the Divide: Muslim and Christian Eritreans in Orange County, 
California. Special Edition, ―Eritrea Abroad: Critical Reflections on the Global 
Diaspora,‖ Eritrean Studies Review 4: 2. 
Wrong, Michela. 2005. I Didn‘t Do it for You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation. 
























I. Demographic Data 
How old are you? 
Where were you born and raised (including geographic region)? 
What is your ethnic group? 
What is your level of education? 
What is your religious background? 
How would you compare your family‘s socio-economic status relative to other 
families you knew? 
Did you complete your military training and national service? 
Were you in Eritrea during the border war? 
Were you assigned a military role?  What was it? 
How was your experience in the military? 
What was your perspective on the border war? 
If you were in Eritrea in 2001, what was your perspective on the events of September 
2001 (arrest of G-15, journalists, students, etc.)? 
What are your opinions on human rights? Why did you expect that you should have 
rights? Where did you get those ideas? 
 
II. Leaving Eritrea 
What were the experiences or conditions that led you to leave Eritrea?  Tell me your 
story. 
How and when did you begin making the decision to leave? 
Describe the process why which you left.  How did you leave?  Who helped you? 
What conditions did you pass through?  What were your experiences on this journey? 
Did you have a particular destination in mind?  Why that destination? 
What were the reasons that led you to come to Ethiopia? 
Do you feel safer in Ethiopia? 
Did you know about Shimelba and the conditions of Eritreans in Ethiopia?  How? 
Did you expect to achieve refugee status or apply for asylum? 
What do you know about ―the refugee regime‖? 
What did you know about how to work through the system that is UNHCR and 
ARRA?  How did you learn that? 
How much money did it cost you to get out of Eritrea?  Where did you get the 
money? 
Did you tell people you were leaving ahead of time? 
Did you have any information about opposition groups in Eritrea?  How did you 
know about the groups?  What was your opinion about their work?  Do you know 
about their problems? 
Describe your understanding of your future and plans once you got out of Eritrea? 
Did you hope to go back after the government changes? 
 
III. Arriving Abroad 
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When did you arrive here? 
By what means did you enter the country? 
Were you detained when you arrived?  What was that experience like? 
Who received you at the border?  How did they treat you? 
Did you go through registration at Enda Baguna or similar? 
Did you know how to begin asking for refugee status/asylum?  What did you know 
and how did you know it? 
Who helped you? 
Describe your interactions with ARRA, UNHCR and opposition groups at this point. 
Did you find that you had to describe your experiences in a particular way to fit what 
the government here need to know? 
Were there aspects of your story that you emphasized or de-emphasized to fit the 
procedures? 
How did you feel about telling your story in this way? 
Did the protection officers or registrars ask you any questions or require information 
that didn‘t makes sense to you? 
How did the experience compare to your expectations? 
Did you feel like the government here would not understand your experiences?  
Why? 
Did you feel the authorities would not believe you?  Why? 
Describe your interview/hearing. 
Did this experience affect how you think about your rights. 
What was your experience with ARRA and UNHCR like? 
Do you feel that there were any trust issues at this point? 
 
IV. Eritrean Community 
What are your ―real‖ problems and enemies here? 
Have you been involved with other Eritreans here?  Which ones? 
Do people know that you‘re a refugee?  That you‘re applying for resettlement? 
Does the Eritrean government know you left?  That you‘re a refugee in Ethiopia?  
That you‘re looking for resettlement? 
Are you afraid of people finding out about your case?  Why? 
Do your family members know about your experiences and hwy you sought asylum? 
Has your family back home been harassed or targeted by the government?  How? 
What do you think about the future or Eritrea? 
Do you care about rights issues in Eritrea and in general?  Which ones? 
Do you do anything to advocate or support human rights issues in Eritrea? 
What are the difficulties with being involved in this community and in this situation? 
 
V. Opposition involvement 
Are you part of any organizations or political groups?  Which ones and why? 
Which opposition parties do you know about?   
What about the internal conflicts?  What do you think the root causes are? 
Do you have solution to these conflicts (what and how to implement these)? 
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Do you think about needs for transparency, rationality and inclusivity? 
Do you know anything about the opposition groups‘ political agenda? 
 
V. Demographic changes 
Who‘s leaving Eritrea? 
Where are they going? 
Who comes to Ethiopia? 
How?  Why? 
Who ends up in Shimelba?  Addis Ababa?  
Are people coming here by legal methods? Crossing the border illegally, and by 
themselves? 
Do new nationality policies affect this migration? 
 
VI. Eritreans in Addis Ababa 
What‘s your idea of Eritrean politics?  (including numbers leaving) 
How has this changed from before, until you wanted to leave, and now that you‘ve 
left? 
Why Ethiopia?  How? Safety? Etc? 
Are you insulated from Eritrean politics because of the conflict with Ethiopia (is it 
better than Sudan, for example)? 
What was your idea about life outside Eritrea? 
Where do you want to end up?  Are some countries better than others? 
What ideas did you have about this process before you left? 
What did you know about human rights before this process? 
Do you use human rights to protect yourself?  Do you understand what that means? 
Where did you learn about human rights? 
What do you think about ARRA and UNHCR and JVA?  Do you trust them? 
If you‘re looking for resettlement elsewhere, what do you think that will be like? 
Do you have some places you‘d rather go than others? 
What are your changing perceptions of the system you‘re going through? 
Do you participate in information networks?  How do you communicate with other 
Eritreans in diaspora?  Your family in Eritrea? 
What do you feel your vulnerabilities are?  The risks of living in Ethiopia in this 
community? 
 
VII. Policy and Mandates  
(for policy makers and organization/institutional employees) 
What, how and why have policies changed?  On what timeline? 
In your perception, how have things changed in practice? 
Do you notice any new trends? 
 Numbers, who‘s coming, how they‘re being treated? 
What ere the responses and new responsibilities of organizations? 
What are the areas of involvement with people outside the camps? 
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Tell me a little bit about what it‘s like to get into and out of the camp – both in 
practice and due to bureaucracy? 
What are the changing roles of your organization with policy changes in the west? 
How do you recognize and rationalized the UNHCR mandate (repatriation, 
integration, resettlement) in this political situation? 
What about the commitment to remain humanitarian? 
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